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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Has defendant's fai lure to provide an adequate transcript 
resulted in a lack of support for his allegations? 
2 . Should the Utah Supreme Court assume the regularity of the 
proceedings below and uphold the lower court's decisions? 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaint i f f -Respondent , t 
- v - : * Case No. 20646 
MYRON HAMILTON, : Category No. 2 
Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
>c< 
STATEMENT QF THE CASE 
Defendant appeals from his convict ion of the o f fenses : 
Failure to Obey a Pol ice Off icer , Fai lure to Respond t o O f f i c e r ' s 
Signal t o Stop, Speeding, No Driver ' s License on Person, and 
Interference With a Public Servant. Defendant was found gu i l ty 
in a jury t r i a l on February 27 and 28, 1984, in the Fif th Circui t 
Court, Sandy Department, the Honorable C. Bailey Sainsbury, 
pres id ing . Defendant appealed t o the Third Judic ia l D i s t r i c t 
Court, in and for Sa l t Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
Homer F. Wilkinson, pres iding. The convic t ions were affirmed. 
STATEMENT QF THE FACTS 
In the area of 10600 South and 300 West, on November 5, 
1983, at 6:34 p.m., Deputy Shane Smith observed a pick up 
trave l ing a t an increas ingly rapid rate (R. 231) . The o f f i cer 
turned on h i s overhead l i g h t s a t approximately 10600 South and 
900 West, but the v e h i c l e did not stop (R. 232) . The o f f i cer 
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then turned on his spotlightf but the driver did not stop until 
10550 South and 1300 West (R. 233). 
The officer approached the vehicle and informed the 
driver of the reason for the stop (R. 9). The driver 
acknowledged seeing the signal, but said he had chosen to ignore 
it (R. 9). The driver began yelling for "counsel" (R. 191), and 
the officer told him he was not under arrest and asked the driver 
for his license. When the driver refused to produce a driver's 
license. Officer Smith placed defendant under arrest and asked 
him to step out of his truck. Defendant responded by fleeing in 
his vehicle from the officer (R. 192). Officer Smith followed 
defendant, and the pickup turned into a driveway and a passenger 
jumped out and locked a gate across the driveway (R. 192). 
Officer Smith took a shotgun from the police car,
 MJ 
stepped through the gate, and again informed defendant he was 
under arrest. Defendant refused to allow a uniformed female 
officer to handcuff him saying that "she wasn't man enough" 
(R. 232). Officer Smith then handed the gun to Officer Foster, 
and Officer Smith attempted to handcuff defendant, who was 
screaming and struggling. Two more officers then arrived and 
assisted officer Smith in handcuffing defendant. Defendant and 
the other people present refused to unlock the gate and so the 
three officers attempted to lift defendant over the gate, despite 
his struggling. They finally managed to get him around the gate. 
On the way to the car, defendant fought and kicked one of the 
officers in the thigh. The defendant was then carried to the 
police vehicle and taken to the Salt Lake County Jail. 
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Defendant does not comply with appellate Rule 11 and 
provide a transcript, but the partial record and partial 
transcripts show the following procedures: 
12-28-83- Defendant filed Constructive Notice of 
suits being prepared against the arresting 
officer and related personnel (R. 136). 
01-03-84- Defendant filed Writ of Error, Coram Nobis 
and Caveat (R. 130) in which defendant claimed 
that the Circuit Court lacked jurisdiction. 
01/11/84- Defendant filed Notice and Demand for 
Counsel of Choice (R. 87, Vol. 1) and a 
Brief in Support of Notice and Demand for 
Counsel of Choice (R. 90, Vol. 1) in which 
he argued that the right to counsel was not 
limited licensed attorneys and that defendant 
should be able to be represented by a "friend" 
layman if he so chose. 
Defendant filed Notice and Demand for Twelve 
Veniremen (R. 121). 
An arraignment hearing was originally scheduled. 
However, at defendant's request, 
the Court granted a second hearing in order to 
have the State representative appear and speak 
to defendant's motion of incomplete discovery 
and the arraignment was postponed until that 
hearing (R. 470-471). 
During this first hearing defendant 
sought to have a lay person act as his counsel 
at counsel table. When the trial court refused 
to allow a non-licensed person to act as an 
attorney saying that an attorney would "be allowed 
[to act] in the case," and exhorted the defendant to 
acquire a bona fide attorney for assistance, 
defendant responded by saying, " I wouldn't 
stoop so low as to have an attorney." (R. 468). 
He was permitted to consult with his unlicensed 
"counsel" friend who was allowed to interrupt the 
.proceedings. Defendant filed a motion for 
dismissal due to incomplete discovery (R. 466-
468) a plea usurping the authority of the trial 
judge, notice and demand for counsel of choice 
and a brief in support of counsel of choice 
(R. 469 and January 11, 1984 transcript). 
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02/06/84- The part ia l transcr ipt shows that t h i s 
hearing was set t o hear defendant's motion for 
discovery and for formal arraignment of the 
defendant* Defendant argued that although the 
prosecution furnished copies of the Information 
and po l i ce o f f i c e r ' s reports , the discovery 
was incomplete because defendant was not given 
the home addresses of the o f f i c e r s and the 
names and home addresses of a l l the people at 
the j a i l (R. 478, 479) . 
Defendant i s t o ld by the Court to get an 
attorney t o help him to decide whether t o f i l e 
a separate ac t ion and t o answer quest ions on these 
things for him. An unident i f i ed fr iend interrupted 
and coached Mr. Hamilton (R. 9 ) . Defendant a l s o 
f i l e d a motion for addi t ional time which was 
denied on the bas i s that the defendant had had 
s u f f i c i e n t time as wel l as addit ional time for 
hearings and preparations (R. 484 ) . Defendant refused 
t o enter a plea (R. 486-487) . When the Court 
questioned defendant as t o h i s understanding of 
the English language and the extent of h i s 
education, defendant refused t o answer the 
quest ions properly and d i r e c t l y and claimed 
that h i s education was i rre levant (R. 483 ) . He 
now demands a dismissal because he "has not been 
awarded a speedy t r i a l w (R. 491) . 
The Court denied the defendant's motion 
and demand for "counsel of choice" or a non-
l i censed attorney and the venire for number 
twelve" (R. 493) . The Court denied defendant's 
motion for severance of o f fenses and a motion 
for a public prosecutor because defendant 
claimed that the a s s i s t a n t county prosecutor 
was not a public o f f i c i a l (R. 493) . 
02 /15 /84- The par t ia l wr i t t en transcr ipt shows 
that during t h i s hearing, defendant f i l e d 
a second demand for addi t ional time on a spec ia l 
s e t t i n g (R. 508 ) . The Court denied defendant's 
motion because three months had passed s ince the 
offense had occurred. The Court a l s o ruled on 
defendant's motion for subpoena duces tecum t o 
the South Jordan Pol ice Department and West 
Jordan Pol ice Department which demanded that the 
o f f i c e r s contact the defendant t o have the i r 
depos i t ions taken and a l s o to submit t o l i e 
detector t e s t s i f the defendant deemed i t 
necessary (R. 513) . The motions were denied 
(R. 514 ) . Defendant made another e f f o r t to 
have the Court allow defendant's "counsel" 
to speak, who was not a l i c e n s e d , pract ic ing 
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attorney in the State of Utah and was to ld 
by the Court t o exerc i s e h is prerogative to 
get an attorney to help him (514, 515) . 
Defendant was a l so denied h i s request for 
400 subpoenas (R. 516) . 
02 /27 /84- A hearing was held on defendant's subpoenas 
in which some wi tnesses were excused. The 
jurors were sworn in and impaneled after 
Voir Dire. The t r i a l was held with defendant 
vo luntar i ly representing himself despi te the 
Court's request and advice (R. 2 ) . Defendant 
was found gu i l ty on a l l charges except for the 
charges of as sau l t on an o f f i cer and improper 
display of l i c e n s e p l a t e s , poss ibly resu l t ing 
from negot iat ion between voluntary pro se 
counsel and the prosecutor (R. 3 ) . 
03 /04 /84- Defendant wrote and f i l e d a signed Appeal 
Brief to D i s t r i c t Court (R. 178), s ta t ing he 
refused to provide the Court with a transcript 
of the t r i a l and that the court w i l l have to get one 
any way i t can (R. 179) . 
03 /05 /84- Defendant pro se counsel f i l e d Notice and 
Appeal for Stay of Execution pending appeal in 
D i s t r i c t Court (R. 4 ) . 
04 /27 /84- Defendant wrote and f i l e d a Supplemental Brief 
in Opposition t o Respondent's Brief (R. 203) 
and a Motion to Strike Respondent's Brief (R. 215) . 
Both appel late b r i e f s s e t forth the ir i s sues and 
seem t o agree on the f a c t s s tated in each others 
b r i e f s and the three part ia l t ranscr ip t s provided 
by the defendant. 
08 /28 /84- Stay of Execution was granted. 
01 /07 /85- After not ice t o f i l e Br ie f s the D i s t r i c t 
Court rendered a Memorandum Decis ion f among 
other th ings , upholding the t r i a l court ' s 
dec i s ion t o refuse "to appoint such counsel for 
an individual who i s not permitted to pract ice 
law in the State of Utah without a l i c e n s e [and] 
i t i s a l so not a denial of the defendant's Sixth 
Amendment r igh t s where the court refuses to permit 
a non-lawyer t o act as h is counsel" (R. 233) . 
01 /09 /85 - Re-imposition of Sentence (R. 4 ) . 
01 /10 /85- Defendant pro se prepared, signed and f i l e d 
Notice of Appeal and Designation of Record for 
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Appeal to Utah Supreme Court (R. 3r 258). 
Defendant filed Affidavit of Poverty (R. 249). 
01/25/85-
01/25/85-
01/28/85-
02/14/85-
02/21/85-
02/26/85-
Defendant signed and filed Notice and 
Demand for Stay of Execution Pending Appeal (R. 3). 
Aaron Stanton, a licensed attorney, called 
the Circuit Court Clerk to inquire whether 
defendant had to be present for sentencing (R. 3). 
Defendant was sentenced, but refused to 
appear (R. 4). 
Defendant prepared and filed Certificate of 
Probable Cause in District Court (R. 362). 
Notice of Hearing on defendants Certificate 
of Probable Cause set before Judge Homer 
Wilkinson (R. 365). 
Defendant filed Jurisdictional Notice where 
defendant claimed that District Court had no 
jurisdiction because the case was pending before 
the Supreme Court. Defendant also stated he 
would not appear at the hearing because of 
medical reasons (R. 368). 
Defendant's motion for a Certificate of 
Probable Cause denied. Defendant did not 
appeal (R. 378). Case remanded. 
Defendant filed Jurisdictional Notice to 
the Circuit Court in which he refused to appear 
before the court for sentencing because the 
court had no jurisdiction since the matter was 
pending before the Supreme Court (R. 374). 
03/20/85- Sentencing Hearing held. Defendant was 
not present (R. 383). 
03/20/85- Defendant filed Writ of Error Coram Nobis 
Caveat. 
03/21/85- Defendant filed for a Writ of Prohibition 
(R. 418) in the separate case of Hamilton v. 
Honorable C. Bailey Sainsburyt Barbara Byrner 
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, and Clerk Tom Brandon, 
03/25/85- Defendant filed Supreme Court appeal (R. 4). 
04/02/85- Continuance of Writ of Prohibition by 
Supreme Court (R. 433). 
03/04/85-
03/18/85-
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04/08/85- Hearing scheduled on Writ of Prohibition 
by Supreme Court with oral argument granted (R. 434) 
04/15/85- Defendant filed Special Appearance 
Memorandum (R. 449) stating his inability "to 
represent myself11 due to illness and his fear of 
being incarcerated (R. 450). 
04/16/85- Writ of Prohibition denied. "The record 
is to be ordered, certified and forwarded to 
this Court" (R. 455). 
04/25/85- 380 pages are certified to the Court from 
the Circuit Court (R. 456). 
SUMMARY QF ARGUMENT 
The defendant has not provided this court with an 
adequate record to support his allegation that he was denied 
assistance of counsel by the trial judge. Therefore, since this 
court is unable to fairly determine if the trial judge acted 
properly, therefore, the District Court's determination should be 
sustained. 
Even so, the partial records and documents submitted 
show that defendant voluntarily and knowledgeably waived the 
right to licensed counsel. This fact is demonstrated by the 
partial oral and written statements of the defendant, the 
defendant's actions and stated attitudes on the subject, and the 
totality of the circumstances of the case. 
The defendant should not now be allowed to use his 
conscious decision to conduct his defense at the trial and 
appeals level as a means to undermine the jury trial and appeal 
decisions that he requested,subvert the judicial system, and 
evade the consequences of his unlawful behavior. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO PROVIDE AN ADEQUATE 
TRANSCRIPT TO SUPPORT HIS ALLEGATIONS. 
The defendant claims that he was denied assistance of 
counsel (now meaning licensed) for his defense during the trial 
and on the appeal to the District Court. This Court has said on 
many occasions that appellant has the duty and responsibility of 
supporting his allegation by an adequate record. State v. 
Wulffenstein. 657 P.2d 289 (Utah 1982). The Court also provides 
a procedure for notifying the Respondent of the issues so the 
Court can be appraised with a transcript or at least an agreed
 i; 
statement of the facts on appeal. U.R.A.P. Rule 11, 11(3) and 
(F). Howeverf the defendant and his counsel have not given this 
Court the benefit of a transcript of the trial proceeding. He 
also did not provide a transcript of the trial in his appeal of 
the jury conviction to the District Court (R. 179), but he did 
provide the District Court with three pre-trial hearing 
transcripts that were the only record that he apparently 
considered relevant. Now the defendant should not be allowed to 
pick and choose only parts of the record going to this appeal 
court. 
Without a proper record of the proceedings below, this 
appeals court should not and cannot second guess the trial 
court1s rulings and the jury findings or the district court's 
review. State v. Theison, 19 Utah Adv. Rep. 14, September 26, 
1985. The regularity of the proceedings below should therefore 
be assumed. This Court not only cannot make decisions based on 
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s i l e n t records i t has said tha t i t won't . I t has said tha t when 
an appeal record i s s i l e n t or not provided, "we do not presume 
e i ther error or pre judice ." State v. Robbins. 21 Utah Adv. Rep. 
37, November 4, 1985, p . 3 quoting Sta te v. Hamilton. 18 Utah 2d 
234, 239, 419 P.2d 770, 773 (1966). 
The defendant argues tha t the record i s s i l e n t 
regarding the issue of denial of counsel. Here, the record of 
the t r i a l appealed from i s simply not provided and i t i s the 
defendant 's burden t o provide an adequate record. State v. 
Sparks f 672 P.2d 92 (1983). Defendant claims that some effor t 
has been made to find the t r i a l tapes 1 (footnote 1, p.3 of 
defendant 's b r i e f ) , but the l o s s of a t r ansc r ip t does not 
necessar i ly ca l l for post-convict ion re l i e f to a defendant who 
did not obtain a t r a n s c r i p t a t the time of the t r i a l or f i r s t 
appeal. See Norwell v. S t a t e . 373 U.S. 420, 10 L.Ed.2d 456, 83 
S. Ct. 1366 (1963). 
POINT II
 ; 
DEFENDANT VOLUNTARILY, KNOWINGLY, AND INTELLIGENTLY 
WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL. 
Even if this court were to review the appeal and 
allegations unsupported by the record or relevant legal 
author i ty , State v. Cook, 714 P.2d 296 (Utah 1986), the port ions 
of the wri t ten pleadings show tha t the defendant knew he was 
e n t i t l e d t o l icensed counsel, quoted the U.S. Const i tut ion on 
"r ight t o ass is tance of counsel ," argued p o l i t i c a l philosophy and 
1
 Respondent located those t r i a l tapes . They were in the c i r c u i t 
court and are in the d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s evidence room as of April 
25, 1986. 
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was begged by the court to get l i c e n s e d counsel at each hearing. 
He knowingly (but obs t ina te ly ) and by apparent design and 
disagreement with the courts of t h i s land f vo luntar i ly refused t o 
hire a l i c ensed attorney and chose with d e f i n i t e in tent and 
purpose to represent himself . Although no t r i a l transcr ipt i s 
provided based on the documents the defendant has chosen to 
provide, including defendant's pro se motions, memorandums, 
b r i e f s , and the t r a n s c r i p t s of three p r e - t r i a l hearings , i t i s 
apparent that the defendant, the t r i a l court and the d i s t r i c t 
court be l i eved the defendant t o have made a knowing, i n t e l l i g e n t , 
and voluntary waiver of h i s r ight to l i c e n s e d counsel , as that 
r ight i s interpreted by the Courts, and asserted h i s fundamental 
r ight t o represent himself . 
The defendant knew that the Federal Sixth Amendment 
guarantees that in a l l criminal prosecutions the accused has the 
r ight to counsel for h i s defense at every s tep in the 
proceedings, including preliminary hearings . He i n s i s t e d on 
"counsel" from the beginning, at a r r e s t , at the p r e - t r i a l 
hearings , and by motion he quoted the Sixth Amendment and argued 
for non- l icensed counsel or the r ight to represent himself . He 
vo luntar i l y did so, unt i l before t h i s Court on the second appeal 
he f i n a l l y agreed t o have l i c e n s e d bar counsel rather than 
represent himself . Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 , 26 L.Ed.2d 
387, 90 s . % ct . 1999 (1970) . Gideon v. Wainrightr 372 U.S. 335, 9 
L.Ed.2d 799, 83 S. Ct. 792, (1963) . 
Defendants waiver of the r ight to counsel i s an 
absolute r ight when made knowingly, v o l u n t a r i l y , and 
- 1 0 -
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intelligently. Carnley v. Cochran. 369 U.S. 5061 8 L.Ed.2d 70, 
82 S.Ct. 884. Edwards v. Arizona. 451 U.S. 477, 68 L.Ed.2d 378, 
101 S.Ct. 1880 (1981). Also, a defendant in a state criminal 
trial has the historically fundamental constitutional right to 
proceed without counsel and to personally make his own defense. 
Faretta v. State of California. 422 U.S. 806, 45 L.Ed.2d 562, 95 
S. Ct. 2525 (1975). This defendant chose the more fundamental 
right to represent himself and wanted to make a political 
statement about his rights to be counseled by anyone, and did so 
at pre-trial. 
Whether an accused has waived his right to the 
assistance of counsel or asserted his right to self 
representation depends, in each case, on the particular facts and 
circumstances of the situation, "including the background, 
experience, and conduct of the accused." Johnson v. Zerbst. 304 
U.S. 458 (1958). Judging from the transcripts of the three pre-
trial hearings, Hamilton has some education and could understand 
and read the English Language (R. 485, 488, 489). He obviously 
consider? himself to be somewhat if not more knowledgeable than 
the judge about the United States Constitution and the Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. He admits, "I read the rules, yes, I've 
studied them" (R. 485). Yet, he challenged the jurisdiction of 
the court, and questioned the trial judge's commitments to 
constitutional ideals, referring to Article Six and Article Three 
of the U.S. Constitution (R. 461, 462, 463). 
At the recorded pre-trial hearings, the trial court was 
patient. He declined to argue with the defendant, but he did 
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allow defendant to make his statements "for the record" (which 
defendant later did not provide). Hamilton then mentioned that 
his "counsel" had something to say (R. 465). However, his 
"counsel" was not an attorney. The trial court refused to allow 
defendant's "counsel" to practice "as an attorney" before the 
court, but the judge allowed the "unknown speaker" to confer with 
and advise the defendant and then the defendant could address the 
court (R. 467). Hamilton responded by saying, "Let the record 
show I'm being denied counsel" referring to the court not 
allowing his demanded unlicensed advisor to sit at counsel table 
(R. 467) . 
Defendant then gave the Court permission to proceed, 
after admitting that the claim for denial of "counsel" was what 
he "wanted anyway" in the record (R. 467) . Immediately after 
this conversation, the trial court asked the defendant "to have a 
bona fide attorney help you" and defendant said, "I wouldn't 
stoop so low as to have an attorney" January 11th transcript p. 
12 L. 7 (R. 468). In that hearing, the defendant went on to file 
a motion for dismissal, a plea usurping the authority of the 
court, notice and demand for counsel of choice, brief in support 
of counsel of choice. and notice and demand for a 12-person jury. 
Defendant then refused to enter a plea. 
During each of the three recorded hearings, the trial 
court counseled the defendant to get an attorney and often 
pointed out the advantages of doing so (R. 483, 494, 501, 514). 
Defendant "wouldn't stoop that low" and refused (R. 483, 494, 
501) and demanded that the judge allow a layman to represent him 
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(R. 514 ) . At the l a s t recorded hearing, defendant s tated that 
"under the Fifth Amendment, I have a right to counsel ," but he 
refused t o be represented or counseled by an attorney or "anyone 
with a l i cense" (R. 515) . After making h i s record he had h i s lay 
counsel go t o the back "with the others" and proceeded t o 
represent himself. 
At the second hearing, where the defendant was formally 
arraigned, the t r i a l court made a record trying t o ascer ta in that 
defendant's dec i s ions and re fusa l s t o obey the Court's advice to 
get a l i c ensed attorney t o represent or advise him were 
under standingly or i n t e l l i g e n t l y made. (R. 483, L. 16, R. 494, 
L. 5 ) . The court inquired about the extent of Hamilton's 
education and h i s understanding of the English Language. 
Defendant was very evasive and refused t o answer any quest ions 
d i r e c t l y . Defendant cut the court off refusing to answer and 
s ta t ing that the l e v e l of schooling he had reached was 
" irre levant ." (R. 489 ) . 
Faced with a defendant who claimed to understand the 
proceedings, ru les and c o n s t i t u t i o n , and who a l s o refused a 
l i c ensed a t torney ' s guidance, the court had no choice but to 
proceed and enter a plea of "not gui l ty" in behalf of defendant 
(R. 4 9 5 ) . Hamilton's knowledge i s shown by h is object ion t o the 
court making a plea, saying "I'm not hiring you as counsel ." (R. 
4 9 6 ) . But^  the Court s t i l l had advised t h i s defendant, "you 
bet ter get an attorney t o help you. Better get an attorney to 
help you get that—those kind of problems solved" (R. 501) . « 
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Clearly, from the overall record, partial transcripts 
and briefs provided the defendant knew of his right to licensed 
counsel and he knowingly and voluntarily demanded to waive that 
right. He was not about to hire one of those "brainwashed" 
attorneys. At the first hearing, in his brief to the trial court 
supporting his demand for counsel of choice, he openly states 
that he is "defending himself (emphasis added) out of necessity, 
not out of desire," because he does not trust the legal 
profession and he cannot afford to pay the fees of the few 
attorneys he does trust, and furthermore, he does not trust or 
want any attorney furnished by the government because "such an 
attorney . . . full of law school brain washing, thinks that the 
Constitution is what the judges say it is, rather than what the 
Constitution itself, says it is" (R. 93, Addendum A, p. 9). 
This defendant knew he had a fundamental constitutional 
right to proceed without counsel in a state criminal trial. 
Faretta v. State of California. 422 U.S. 806, 45 L.Ed.2d 562, 95 
S. Ct. 2525 (1975). State v. Ruple, 631 P.2d 874 (Utah 1981). 
The defendant obviously knew he was free to decide whether having 
an attorney is to his advantage but the Sixth Amendment guarantee 
of counsel cannot be "an organ of the state interposed between an 
unwilling defendant and his right to defend himself personally." 
Faretta at p. 82 0 (emphasis added). Defendant knowingly and 
voluntarily invoked the right of self-representation and he 
demanded that the courts honor that invocation. For example, in 
his brief in support of notice and demand for counsel of choice, 
Hamilton writes, "To use the power of the Court to force the 
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defense in to using an o f f i cer of the Court at the defense table 
offends the s e n s i b i l i t i e s of the defendant to the very core. 
Defendant may wish to voluntarily select an attorney among his 
counself but this defendant believes that he should not be forced 
to do SQ.W 
Forcing an accused t o accept a state-appointed public 
defender against h i s w i l l deprives that person of his 
cons t i tu t iona l right to conduct h i s own defense. Faretta , at 
836. Hamilton wrote that forcing him in to accepting an attorney 
offended h i s " s e n s i b i l i t i e s t o the very core ." He bel ieved he 
should not be forced into using an attorney (Id.) If any court 
had forced an attorney on the defendant defendant could have and 
would have l e g i t i m a t e l y argued that his cons t i tu t iona l right to 
s e l f - represen ta t ion had been v i o l a t e d . However, having chosen to 
represent himself with lay "counsel of choice" advis ing and 
speaking in the background, Hamilton cannot now complain that he 
was denied the opportunity of a s s i s tance of l i c ensed counsel . 
Faretta r at 581, Footnote 46 . He should not be allowed t o play 
games with the system of j u s t i c e . 
From a reading of the preliminary hearings t r a n s c r i p t s , 
i t appears that defendant i s trying to d i s t o r t the protect ions 
given t o a person accused of a crime to f i t h i s own des i re s and 
l e g a l d e f i n i t i o n s . An e f for t to defeat the seeking of truth and 
the doing
 vof j u s t i c e by misusing c o n s t i t u t i o n a l safeguards i s 
prohibited. State v. Gray. 601 P.2d 918 (Utah 1979) • The 
defendant could therefore accuse the t r i a l judge of i n j u s t i c e 
i r regard le s s of the judge 1s d e c i s i o n s . "Catch 22's" are not 
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allowed. As an example, at the first hearing on January 11, 
1984, defendant filed a motion for discovery, and a motion to 
dismiss, and a motion claiming the court had no jurisdiction. 
Those are all inconsistent with each other but the trial court 
granted the motion for discovery. Defendant then filed a motion 
to dismiss due to incomplete discovery, a plea usurping the 
court1s authority, notice, demand, and brief for counsel of 
choice, and notice and demand for 12 jurors. The trial court 
granted defendant's request for another hearing in order to , 
effect discovery from the prosecutor and to hold the arraignment 
at that time. Then, at the second hearing on February 6, 1986, 
the defendant asked for an extension of time and that the trial 
be set at a later date. The court did not grant that request 
because the offense had occurred on November 7, 1984 and the 
defendant had had three months of notice. After the delays 
caused by the defendant, the Judge held a formal arraignment. 
After these delaying tactics, this defendant attempted to use the 
system by making a motion to dismiss the charges on the grounds 
that he had been denied a speedy trial* 
The potential for abuse should be obvious. The 
defendant made it very clear that he did not want a bona fide 
attorney. Now defendant is arguing that the trial court and 
district court erred by not assigning him an attorney, even when 
to do so would have required the lower courts to force an 
attorney upon him, however, without the defendant's consent, 
there is no allocation of power to a defendant's counsel to make 
binding decisions. Faretta. at 820. With this dilemma the court 
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could only beg defendant to get counsel. Defendant never 
accepted the trial court's admonitions to get an attorney, and he 
continued to represent himself and to claim the right to conduct 
his own defense. The transcript of the January 11th hearing 
demonstrates that the trial court had had notice that defendant 
would be representing himself. Although defendant did not 
provide an adequate record of the entire court proceedings nor a 
transcript of the trial, it is, however, clear from the documents 
before this Court that the defendant made a knowing and 
intelligent waiver of the right to counsel, and knowingly and 
with some intelligence asserted his right to self representation 
and went ahead and represented himself. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT DEFENDANT 
WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
A defendant has a cons t i tu t iona l right to defend 
himself pro se . Farretta v. State of Cal i forn ia , 422 U.S. 806, 
45 L.Ed.2d 562, 95 S. Ct. 792 (1975) . However, the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel i s of great importance since counsel 
i s valuable in obtaining a f a i r t r i a l . Gideon, But there can be 
an "intent ional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or 
p r i v i l e g e . " Johnson v> Zerbst* 
Since i t i s the d e f e n d a n t s subject ive understanding 
which roust be determined, the t r i a l court needs d i s c r e t i o n in 
deciding whether a v a l i d waiver of counsel e x i s t s in each 
individual circumstance. State v. Chavis, 644 P.2d 1202, 1205 
(Wash. 1982) . Some of the circumstances bes ides education and 
the d e f e n d a n t s responses t o quest ions are: background, prior 
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experience in l ega l proceedings, a b i l i t y to comprehend, and 
mental hea l th . ££!&££. See Fowler v. U.S-
 r 411 A.2d 618 (D.C. 
App. 1980) . See a l so State v. Chavis. 644 P.2d 1202 (Wash. 
1982) . The courts have a l s o looked t o the t o t a l circumstances 
created by the defendant and the conduct of a defendant t o 
determine whether there was a waiver. 
Where a defendant stubbornly r e s i s t e d hir ing an 
attorney when he could afford i t or pers i s t ed in demanding 
"counsel of cho ice ," some courts have held that such behavior 
cons t i tu ted a v a l i d waiver of right t o appointed counsel . U.S. 
V, Weninger, 624 F.2d 163 (1980) and Jones v. S t a t e , 499 S.2d 253 
(Fla. 1984) , r e s p e c t i v e l y . Following t h i s waiver, the t r i a l 
court s t i l l must inquire whether the defendant was competent t o 
e x e r c i s e h i s right to s e l f - r e p r e s e n t a t i o n and was determined t o 
do so . jiQH£J5# at 257. 
In t h i s appeal, even before the f i r s t hearing 
commenced, defendant had f i l e d with the court motions and 
statements (R. 462) pro se . From those documents, i t was c lear 
that everyone understood that the defendant was preparing h i s own 
defense and invoking h i s fundamental r ight to s e l f -
representat ion . At each of the three transcribed hear ings , 
defendant demanded t o be allowed t o have h i s "friend" act as h i s 
counsel of choice . Defendant abso lute ly s tated to the court 
several times that he refused t o permit a l i c e n s e d attorney to 
represent him and that he intended to proceed pro s e . At the 
f i r s t hearing, defendant f i l e d a brief completed prior to the 
judge ' s rul ing which purported to support defendant's demand for 
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counsel of choice and d e f i n i t i v e l y s tated h i s personal views and 
d i s t r u s t of the l e g a l profess ion . (See Addendum A, R. 90) In 
that br ie f , the defendant s tated ". . . some persons can qual i fy 
for a Public Defender. That i s l i k e being alone in a p i t of 
cobras and someone comes along and wants t o throw in another 
cobra. Under those circumstances, what i s needed i s a mongoose, 
(Counsel of Choice) , not another cobra. Perhaps the SIM, 
CHAMBERS weren't so bad after a l l" (R. 113, Addendum A, p. 2 4 ) . 
Defendant's pleadings , statements and a t t i tude a l l exhibited an 
awareness of h i s r ight t o l i c ensed counsel , a f ami l i ar i ty with 
l ega l procedure, prior use of the system, and a d i s t r u s t of 
lawyers and judges. In f a c t , he s t a t e s there "were very" few 
that he could t r u s t . Therefore, the t r i a l court reasonably 
determined that a l l of t h i s coupled with defendant's pers i s tence 
in demanding non- l icensed "counsel of choice" and refusal to 
accept a bona-fide attorney const i tuted a knowing waiver of the 
r ight to counsel .
 v 
The t r i a l court t r i e d t o conduct a Faretta type of 
i n v e s t i g a t i o n , and "open the defendant's eyes" t o the dangers of 
representing himself . The t r i a l court pointed out to defendant 
the s p e c i f i c ways such as ge t t ing an attorney who would be able 
to aid him in deciding who to subpoena. (R. 468, explaining that 
an attorney would expla in the charges) (R. 494, an attorney would 
explain the law and help f i l e a complaint) (R. 501, ge t t ing an 
attorney would help solve problems). At the second hearing, the 
Court questioned defendant concerning h i s educational background 
in order t o try t o e s t a b l i s h defendant's competency t o waive his 
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r ight to counsel (R. 488, 4 8 9 ) . The defendant was evas ive and 
refused t o answer the judge 1 s quest ions d i r e c t l y . F i n a l l y , the 
defendant refuses t o answer at a l l . 
Throughout the three transcribed hearings, defendant 
was argumentative and d i srupt ive . He pounced on any statement 
made which he be l ieved to be in error. If the judge would have 
continued press ing quest ions j u s t for the record, in l i g h t of 
defendant's oral and wri t ten statements , the defendant could have 
claimed that the t r i a l court harassed him and t r i e d t o dissuade 
him from h i s in tent to conduct h i s own defense. The judge 's 
d i s c r e t i o n in al lowing a waiver of l i c e n s e d counsel under these 
t o t a l circumstances should therefore be honored. 
The Defendant-Appellant should not be allowed t o take a 
bad f a i t h advantage of the Const i tut ion . The defendant and the 
State have the r ight to an orderly and e f f i c i e n t t r i a l . The 
Tenth Circui t held that the right to counsel must be weighed 
against the need for e f f i c i e n t and a f f e c t i v e administrat ion of 
j u s t i c e . U.S. v, Gipson. 693 F.2d 109 (1982). In an e a r l i e r 
case , U.S. v. Weininger. 624 F.2d 163 (1980) , the Tenth Circui t 
quoted Kates v. Nelson, 435 F.2d 1085, 1088-89 (Ninth Circui t 
1970) where the court said that a defendant should not be allowed 
to use h i s r ight to counsel and to s e l f - r e p r e s e n t a t i o n as a 
stratagem to "fraudulently seek t o have the t r i a l judge placed in 
a p o s i t i o a where, in moving along the business of the court, the 
judge appears t o be a r b i t r a r i l y depriving the defendant of 
counsel ." The Sixth Amendment should not be used as a "device t o 
abuse the d igni ty of the court or to f r u s t r a t e orderly 
proceedings." JLonfiLSr a t 257. That i s exact ly t h i s case . 
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In the case a t bar, the defendant knew what he was 
doing. The defendant interrupted the court hearings several 
tiroes try ing to force the court in to allowing a non- l icensed, 
untrained individual to pract ice as an attorney before the court. 
Defendant was aware that a record was being made of the 
proceedings, (he wanted h i s own tape at t r i a l ) and when the court 
refused defendant's demand for counsel of choice , defendant 
s ta t ed , "Let the record show I'm being denied counsel" (R. 467). 
Defendant admitted t o the t r i a l judge that the purpose of 
presenting h i s fr iend as "counsel" was to get a denial of counsel 
i ssue in the record (R. 407) . 
When defendant appealed t o the D i s t r i c t Court, h i s 
brief discussed and framed the i s sue as a "denial of counsel of 
cho ice ." Now, before t h i s Court af ter accepting an appointed 
attorney, defendant seeks t o argue, not a denial of an absolute 
r ight to "counsel of cho ice ," but a Sixth Amendment denial of the 
right t o an attorney. Thus, the defendant delays and attempts to 
subvert j u s t i c e and mocks the lower c o u r t ' s d i s c r e t i o n . 
The t r i a l court was faced with a defendant who 
challenged the judge's commitment t o honor and defend the 
cons t i tu t ion (R. 462), who berated the a s s i s t a n t county attorney 
(R., 498, 499) and who claimed t o have read and understood the 
Rules of Criminal Procedure (R. 485) . Throughout the hearings, 
the t r i a l .court treated defendant with respect , honoring a l l of 
h i s r i g h t s . The t o t a l i t y of the circumstances c l e a r l y show that 
defendant, with h i s eyes open and h i s mind aware of what he was 
doing and the poss ib le consequences of h i s a c t i o n s , vo luntar i ly 
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and knowingly waived his right to licensed counsel, both at the 
trial and appellate levels. Any lack of record of extensive 
waiver questioning given the defendants obvious intent and 
displeasure at being questioned, was certainly harmless error. 
D.S. v. Gipson. 693 F.2d 109 (10th Cir. 1982). Defendant was 
allowed to proceed with the assistance of his friend, although 
not at licensed counsel table. He cross examined all of the 
State1 s witnesses. He subpoenaed and had his family members and 
his own witnesses testify in his defense. He got a jury trial, 
and was allowed to testify himself and to present opening and 
closing statements and jury instructions that he had prepared. 
Therefore, he actually received the "opportunity" for as much or 
more process due to any other citizen of the State or Country. 
POINT IV
 ; ^  
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY ADDRESSED THE 
ISSUE OF COUNSEL DEFENDANT PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Defendant filed a pro se brief with Judge Homer 
Wilkinson appealing his conviction from the jury trial in Fifth 
Circuit Court. The brief was somewhat consistent with the 
arguments made before trial. It presented basically the same 
complaints and allegations of error placed before the trial 
court. Defendant presented his issue of counsel to the appeals 
court in this manner: 
"The Trial Judge did not seem to understand 
£he difference between a lawyer to represent, 
and a fcounsel to act and advise.1 
The defendant was openly denied counsel of 
any kind. Defendant was present and his counsel 
was present and ready to aid the defendant but 
was forbidden to act or counsel the defendant . . • 
Defendant moves for dismissal pursuant to the 
Trial Court1s error in denying the defendant 
unfettered counsel of choice." (Appeal Brief, R. 354) 
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The issue defendant presented t o the D i s t r i c t Court was 
not a denial of right to counsel , but a denial of d e f e n d a n t s 
demand t o have a non l i c ensed f non attorney represent him in a 
court of law. Defendant's brief argues that Judge Wilkinson 
should have addressed the issue of right to l i c ensed counselr but 
that was not the i s sue raised by defendant at t r i a l . 
Defendant obviously knew of h i s r ight to counsel 
because he quoted the Magna Carta and Angersinger v. HamlinP 4 07 
U.S. 25 (1975) which he says s t a t e s that an accused may not be 
imprisoned for a misdemeanor unless he has been represented by 
counsel . That case would obviously refer to l i c e n s e d counsel . A 
reference t o t h i s case under these en t i re circumstances shows 
that t h i s defendant knew at a l l s tages of the appeal that he 
could have a member of the bar represent him if he so des ired. 
(R. 354) . 
In defendant's Supplemental Brief in Opposition to the 
Respondent's Brief , defendant shows h i s actual understanding of 
h i s r i g h t s on the i ssue of counsel . He s t a t e s that the court has 
informed him that he needs a l i c e n s e d lawyer or that he can 
represent himself . He again makes i t c lear that he does not want 
a lawyer, and that he i s aware of h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r ights by 
quoting Art. IV of the U.S. Const i tut ion (R. 209 ) . The defendant 
c l e a r l y w r i t e s , "The court has required that I secure a l i c e n s e d 
lawyer t o pract ice in t h i s court" (R. 209 ) . 
Defendant attempts t o force a "Catch 22" impossible 
scenario on the s c a l e s of j u s t i c e . I t would have been a 
v i o l a t i o n of defendant's cons t i tu t iona l r ight to "carry on h i s 
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own defense" i f e i ther Court would have forced an attorney on 
defendant by ass igning him one. As pointed out , an attorney can 
only exerc i se power and authority in behalf of an individual when 
4 
that person has consented to be represented by that at torney. 
Now the defendant argues that s ince the courts d idn' t deny h i s 
r ight to defend himself pro se and force an attorney on him, he 
has been denied h i s r ight to l i c ensed counsel . Such a 
construct ion of the Const i tut ion would laugh in the face of 
j u s t i c e r e s p e c i a l l y in l i g h t of the obvious knowledge of the 
defendant and h i s voluntary waivers and r e f u s a l s to "stoop so 
low" as t o allow a l i c e n s e d attorney to represent him. 
The "sophistry" that the defendant attempts t o impose 
would require an unnumbered round of r e t r i a l s for those that 
supposedly change the i r minds and decide l a t e r that they r e a l l y 
did not want t o represent themselves—or that they la ter r e a l l y 
d idn ' t want bar counsel but wanted the ir r ight of s e l f 
representat ion . Such i s not the intent of the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
founders, or the balance of j u s t i c e ; the argument should 
therefore be re jectedl 
I t i s apparent from the b r i e f s presented t o the 
D i s t r i c t Court that defendant knew of h i s Sixth Amendment r ight 
t o a l i c e n s e d at torney, and that he vo luntar i l y and knowingly 
waived h i s right t o l i c e n s e d counsel . Defendant merely wanted 
the lower courts t o rule on the i ssue of whether defendant could 
choose to be represented in court by a non-attorney. The 
D i s t r i c t Court did rule on that i s sue as presented and argued and 
properly found that the t r i a l court correct ly "refused to permit 
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a non-lawyer t o ac t as d e f e n d a n t ' s counse l . U.C.A. § 78-51-25 
(1953) a s amended). U-S- v. Ke l l ey . 539 F.2d 1199. U.S. V. 
Jo rdan . 508 F.2d 750." F ind ing . Number 1 , (S t a t e v. Hamilton, 
Memorandum Decision December 1 1 , 1984). 
CONCLUSION 
Since defendant has f a i l e d t o follow the a p p e l l a t e 
r u l e s and has not produced a complete or adequate r eco rd . This 
Court cannot and should not r u l e on t h e mere a l l e g a t i o n s in t h e 
a p p e a l . Since the record simply i s not he re f the Court should 
presume the v a l i d i t y of t he lower proceedings and uphold t h e 
lower c o u r t ' s d i s c r e t i o n . This Court should not presume 
p re jud ice or wrongdoing by t h e c o u r t s . 
But r from the papers before the c o u r t , i t i s apparent 
t h a t defendant was informed of h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t t o t he 
counsel and the a s s i s t a n c e of a l i c e n s e d , t r a i n e d and competent 
a t t o r n e y . When d e f e n d a n t ' s r eques t t o have a non-lawyer 
r e p r e s e n t him was denied , defendant v o l u n t a r i l y chose t o and did 
r e p r e s e n t h imself . He c l e a r l y knew he could have but did not 
want an a t t o r n e y from the ba r . He made a knowing and vo lun ta ry 
waiver of h i s r i g h t t o an a t t o r n e y and chose t o p a r t i c i p a t e in 
the cour t proceedings and the d i s t r i c t cour t appeal pro s e . 
An i n c r e a s i n g number of defendants seek t o use the 
j u d i c i a l system as a forum in which t o exp re s s t h e i r own 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of the U.S. C o n s t i t u t i o n , make p o l i t i c a l 
s t a t emen t s and t o r a i l a g a i n s t t he a u t h o r i t y of the c o u r t s t o 
i n t e r p r e t t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n . They claim p r o t e c t i o n under the 
C o n s t i t u t i o n , and then t r y t o t w i s t those r i g h t s t o avoid the 
- 2 5 -
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American system of j u s t i c e . Defendan t ' s f a m i l i a r i t y with the 
l e g a l p r o c e s s , h i s knowledge of h i s r i g h t s , and h i s awareness of 
t h e consequences of h i s a c t i o n s a r e obvious from the l i m i t e d 
record p rovided . Since he waived l i c e n s e d counsel and demanded 
and was g ran ted t h e counsel and a s s i s t a n c e of a f r i end and 
r ece ived an oppor tun i ty for a f a i r j u r y t r i a l , he has not been 
p re jud iced and t h e lower c o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n s should be upheld. 
Defendant has had h i s day in c o u r t . He unde r s t and ing ly 
and d e l i b e r a t e l y chose not t o be a s s i s t e d by an a t t o r n e y and 
a s s e r t e d h i s b a s i c r i g h t t o defend himself and l o s t t h a t i s s u e as 
p re sen ted on a p p e a l . He was convic ted by s ix of h i s p e e r s , 
s u s t a i n e d on a p p e a l . The mat te r should be f i n a l and t h e 
defendant not be allowed a second, t h i r d or fou r th chance because 
of s o p h i s t r y . There fo re , respondent r e s p e c t f u l l y r e q u e s t s t h i s 
Court t o a f f i rm t h e c o n v i c t i o n of defendant and t o uphold t h e 
d e c i s i o n s of the lower c o u r t s . 
Respec t fu l ly submit ted t h i s ^ ^ day of June , 1986. 
DAVID L. 
A t t 
BRUCE M. HALE 
A s s i s t a n t At torney General 
- 2 6 -
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ADDENDUM A 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF DEMANDING 
COUNSEL OF CHOICE 
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Myron A. Hamilton 
9429 South 1300 West 
Township 3S R 1W 
Salt Lake County, Utah 84065 
IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH J . 
PLAINTIFF, ) CASE NO. 83 TFSY 493 
VS ) 
MYRON A. HAMILTON ) BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF NOTICE 
) AND DEMAND FOR COUNSEL OF 
ACCUSED. ) CHOICE 
The Sixth Amendment to the U. S. Constitution states: 
MIn all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right...to have the assistance of counsel 
for his defense.11 
Defendant asks the Court to take Judicial Notice of the fact 
that many of the men who contriouted to the writing or ratifyinq of 
the Constitution were attorneys such as John Jay, first Chief 
Justice of our U. S. Supreme Court, and John Marshall, a later 
Chief Justice. John Adams, James Wilson, John Blaire, and Oliver 
Ellsworth were among the many fine attorneys who assisted in 
approving the language used in our Constitution. Are we to believe 
that the word "COUNSEL11 was selected by these "attorneys•• with no 
thought whatever to its Common Law meaning of that time? 
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In discussing a Defendant's Right of Counsel, the U. S. Supreme 
Court held: 
"...his right to be heard through his own counsel is 
UNQUALIFIED.11 (emphasis added) Chandler vs. Fretag, 
348 U.S. 3 
* In consulting Noah Webster's 1828 dictionary, the word 
"Unqualified" is defined as: 
"Not modified, limited or restricted by conditions or 
exceptions;..." (Noah Webster's First Edition of an 
American Dictionary of the English Language, 1828, 
republished in facsimile edition by Foundation for 
American Christian Education, San Francisco, California, 
second edition, 1980) 
It is undeniable that the explicit use of the word "counsel" 
in the sixth Amendment was intended to mean someone other than an 
attorney, as well as an attorney. This view is upheld by the U.S. 
District Court when they recognized an accountant as counsel and 
reprimanded an IRS employee: 
"Yet while he was informing the prospective defendant 
of his Right to Counsel, he was simultaneously 
requesting that the Defendants Counsel leave the 
interrogation. In effect, the investigator informed 
Tarlowski that he might have his attorney present, but 
not his accountant." 
Ruling in favor of Tarlowski's motion to suppress, the Court 
"For a government official to mouth in a ritualistic way 
/r part of the warning about the right to counsel, while 
excluding the person relied upon as counsel is, in 
effect, to reverse the meaning of the words used.M U.S. 
vs. Tarlowski, (69-2 U.S.T.C. & D.C. EA. Dist. N.Y.) 
305 F. Supp. 112 (1969) 
Defendant also asks the Court to take Judicial Notice of the 
use of the word "COUNSEL" in the 17th century: 
"...and in all courts persons of all persuasions (sic) 
may freely appear in their own way, and according to 
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their own manner and there plead their own causes 
themselves, or if unable, by their friends..." 
(emphasis added) Fundamental Constitution for the / 
Province of East Jersey (1683)• 
To have a "friend" act as Counsel was a Common Law Right 
and was recognized as such in the Bill of Rights when the word 
"counsel" was used instead of "attorney". 
"The language of the Constitution cannot be interpreted 
safely, except by reference to common law and to British 
institutions as they were when the instrument was framed 
and adopted. The statemen and lawyers of the convention 
who submitted it to the ratification of conventions of 
the thirteen states, were born and brought up in the 
atmosphere of the common law and thought and spoke in 
its vocabulary...when they came to put their conclusions 
into the form of fundamental law in a compact draft, they 
expressed them in terms of common law*, confident that 
they could be shortly and easily understood." (emphasis 
added) Exparte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 108 (1925) 
No limit or qualification was ever intended to be put upon 
the Right to "assistance of counsel" in the Sixth Amendment and 
Defendant submits the word "counsel" was used in recognition of 
the Common Law Right to have one's "friends" speak for a Defendant, 
if he so chose. Reference to the Common Law is mandatory in a 
proper interpretation of the Constitution, but most particularly 
in the Bill of Rights. There is a preponderance of U.S. Supreme 
Court cases which uphold the position of Defendant on interpretation 
of the Constitution. * 
"as men whose intentions require no concealment, 
generally employ the words which most directly and 
aptly express the ideas they intend to convey: the 
enlightened patriots who framed our constitution 
and the people who adopted it must be understood 
to have employed the words in their natural sense, 
and to have intended what they have said." Gibbons 
vs. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824) 
And; 
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"In the construction of the constitution, we must look 
to the history of the times, and examine the state of 
things existing when it was framed and adopted. 12 
Wheat 354; 6 Wheat 416; 4 Poters 4 31-2; to ascertain 
the old law, the mischief and the remedy.•• The State 
of Rhode Island vs. The State of Massachusetts, 37 U.S. 
657 (1938) 
And also, in speaking further of Constitutional provisions, 
we find: v' 
"We agree, it is not to be frittered away by doubtful 
construction, but like every clause in every constitution 
it must have reasonable interpretation, and be held to 
express the intention of the framers." Woodson vs. 
Murdock, 89 U.S. 351, 369 (1874) 
And further, 
M
 The necessities which gave birth to.the Constitution, 
the controversies which precede its formation and the 
conflicts of opinion which were settled by its adoption, 
may properly be taken into view for the purposes of 
tracing to its source, any particular provision of the 
Constitution, in order thereby, to be enabled to correctly 
interpret its meaning.11 Pollock vs. Farmers* Loan & Trust 
Co.. 157 U.S. 429, 558-
History shows conclusively that it was a Common Law Right to 
be represented in court by a "friend" rather than an attorney, if 
one chose. Defendant claims that right herein, which the Sixth 
Amendment did indeed secure, and is not subject to "revision" by 
the American Bar Association. 
"Undoubtedly what went before the adoption of the 
Constitution may be resorted to for the purpose of 
throwing light on its provisions." Marshall vs. 
Gordon, 243 U.S. 521, 533 (1971) 
Each word has a particular meaning and was deliberately chosen, 
the word "Counsel" was not idly set down as the law of this land, 
but, on the contrary, was selected with great skill and meaning. 
"To disregard such a deliberate choice of words and 
their natural meaning, would be a departure from the 
first principle of Constitutional interpretation. •In 
expounding the Constitution of the United States', said 
Chief Justice Taney in Holmes vs. Jennison, 14 540, 570, 
571, •every word must have its due force and appropriate c^3 
meaning; for it is evident from the whole instrument. 
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that, no word was unnecessarily used, or needlessly 
added* The manly discussions which have taken place 
upon the construction of the Constitution, have proved 
the correctness of this proposition: and shown the high 
talent, the caution and the foresight of the illustrious 
men who framed it. Every word appears to have been 
weighed with the utmost deliberation and its for.ee and 
effect to have been fully understood." (emphasis added) 
Wright vs. U.S., 302 U.S. 583 (1938) 
Little did the framers of our Constituion, who labored so long 
and hard to fashion it, realize that the day might come when it 
would be ridiculed by law professors, snickered at by law clerks, 
and consigned to the wastebasket by attorneys, the bar, and the 
Judiciary. 
To narrowly interpret the word "Counsel" to mean only "Licensed 
attorneys" is an infringement of Defendant's Sixth Amendment Right 
to Counsel, which even the U. S. Supreme Court has held is 
"unqualified"• (Chandler, supra) 
The words of the Amendment are simple, clear, and not 
ambiguous and were obviously written by our forefathers to be 
understood by The People, as the following citation undeniably 
indicates: , 
"The Constitution was written to be understood by 
the voters: its words and phrases were used in their 
normal and ordinary, as distinguished from technical 
\ meaning: where the intention is clear, there is no room 
for construction, and no excuse for interpolation or 
addition.'1 Martin vs. Hunter's Leassee, 1 Wheat 304: 
Gibbons vs. Ogden, 9 Wheat 1: Brown vs. Maryland, 12 
Wheat 419: Craig vs. Missouri, 4 Pet. 10: Tennesee vs. 
Whitworth, 117 U.S. 139: Lake County vs. Rollins, 130 
U.S. 662: Hodges vs. United States, 203 U.S. 1: Edwards 
vs. Cuba R. Co., 268 U.S. 628: The Pocket Veto Case, 
* 279 U.S. 655 (justice) Story on the Constitution, 5th 
ed., sec. 451: Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 2nd 
ed., p. 61, 70. 
And further, 
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"It cannot be presumed that any clause in the 
Constitution is intended to be without effect:..." 
Marbury vs. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 174 (1803) 
In passing, it might be noted that Chief Justice John Marshall, 
who principally was responsible for the holding in the above cited 
Majfbury case, and who seems to be looked upon by most attorneys and 
judges as the greatest of our Supreme Court justices, is reported 
to have had two weeks law school preparation, at which time half 
his study was philosophy. 
Also; 
"The Constitution is a written instrument. As such, 
its meaning does not alter. That which it meant when 
it was adopted, it means now." South Carolina vs. 
United States, 199 U.S. 437, 448 (1905) 
Defendant is deeply perturbed at the erosion of his 
Constitutional Right to Counsel by the very legal profession 
itself. The restriction of the Courts to professional attorneys 
only, is the result of attorneys who sat in our legislatures and 
voted upon laws which involved, for them, a conflict of interest 
and which were, and are, upheld by their brother attorneys, who 
sit on the benches of our Courts, ruling in violation of the 
Sovereign will of The People, which it is their sworn duty to 
obey^ Any State law which prohibits laymen from speaking on behalf 
of another, when sought for that purpose, is a violation of the 
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment. Any implementation of such State 
laws also violates Defendant's rights to freedom of speech, wherein 
he may speak through whom he chooses; to freedom of association 
wherein he may associate with whom he pleases; to due process of 
law, wherein he is denied Counsel of his choice and, therefore, as 
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a consequence, he is denied a fair trial, and he is also denied 
an impartial jury by being unable to speak, as he knows he should, 
through Counsel of trust to the Jury. 
To be denied a layman to assist him with advice and to act 
as a spokesman at Defendant's request, is to subject Defendant to 
unequal treatment under the law. As will be shown in Defendant's 
Exhibit MAM, Defendant, as an unconvicted citizen, has less rights 
and inferior treatment than prisoners in State and Federal prisons, 
who are permitted "jailhouse1' lawyers, laymen who "practice law" 
on behalf of their fellow prisoners, and with the approval of many 
Courts. 
Defendant, an unconvicted Citizen, is denied the right to 
contract when he is forbidden the assistance of one who is willing 
to speak for him on Defendant's request. The denial of Defendant's 
right to contract, it is respectfully submitted, is because 
attorneys, who are, in the State, members of a bar association, 
for which they have promoted a monopoly through their controlled 
legislature, have purported to make a "law" for the protection of 
a "public", whereas, they have actually instigated a self-serving 
franchise in great part, at the expense of the public, and, in 
Defendant's view, to the detriment of Constitutional government. 
Again, Defendant is denied a "fair trial" and an impartial 
jury when a so-called "lawM prohibits him from contracting with 
one of his choice for Defendant's legal defense against a hostile 
government bent on punishing Defendant for the exercise of the 
very Constitutional Rights the government should be upholding 
rather than attacking. 
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The aforementioned rights are infringed, abridged, and denied 
when the word "counsel" is qualified to mean only attorneys may y 
speak for the defense in a Court of Law. This was not the case 
in Tarlowski, where the "Counsel" referred to by the Court was an 
accountant. 
It appears to Defendant that a careful consideration of the 
words of the Sixth Amendment, securing his right to Counsel of 
CHOICE must be undertaken here. Since no words were idly selected 
by the forefathers, let us emphasize them here and now so that there 
can be no misunderstanding as to their meaning, for Defendant 
believes his stand in this matter is Constitutionally correct. 
The vital words here are: 
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused SHALL ENJOY 
the RIGHT...to have the ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL for his 
defense." 
Defendant requests the Court's indulgence and patience for a 
brief analysis of the words capitalized above, as where his Life, 
Liberty, or Property is involved, it is not a matter which he 
takes lightly. 
For the source of the common meaning of common words in use 
when the Constitution was written, I refer to Noah Webster's First 
Edition of an American Dictionary of the English Language, 1828, 
Republished in facsimile edition by; Foundation for American 
Christian Education, San Francisco, California, Second Edition, 
1980. 
ALL: "a. Every one,...the whole quantity, extent, duration, 
amount, quality, or degree:...This word signifies the 
whole or entire thing..." 
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It is obvious on its face that the word "all" allows for no 
exceptions and is all-inclusive, and it is also obvious that the 
Sixth Amendment therefore allows for no criminal trial where it 
does not apply. 
SHALL: "v.i. In the present tense, shall...forms the 
future tenser...informs another that a fact is 
to take place...In the second and third persons, 
shall implies a promise, command or determination. 
• You shall receive... • •• 
The word ••shall", in legal contemplation, is mandatory; it 
is a word Mof command,...must be given a compulsory meaning." it 
is clearly so stated on page 1233 of Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth 
Edition, 1979. \> 
ENJOY; Mv.t....To feel or perceive with pleasure: to take 
pleasure or satisfaction in the possession or 
experience of...We enjoy a free constitution and 
inestimable privileges.11 
Defendant has informed the Court that he has little confidence 
in the legal profession of Haldiman, Erlichman, Mitchell and Dean, 
and Nixon and Agnew, and not to mention many others. He is defending 
himself out of necessity, not out of desire. Defendant is aware of 
a few attorneys he trusts, but their multi-thousand dollar fees are 
out of the question for this Defendant. He does not trust just any 
attorney out of a grab-bag whom the government is willing to furnish; 
neither would this defendant be satisfied with such an "attorney'sM 
concept for the Constitution of the United States--after the average 
attorney, full of law-school brain-washing, thinks that the 
Constitution is what the judges say it is, rather than what the 
Constitution itself, says it is. 
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If Defendant cannot "enjoy" the "assistance of counsel" from 
the bar (legal establishment) then he has the undeniable right of 
Counsel which he can enjoy. To deny this, is to deny his rights 
under the Sixth Amendment to Counsel. It is.the use of the word 
MENJOYM as well as "COUNSEL" which gives a Defendant the Right to 
Counsel of his choice, licensed or unlicensed, as is allowed for 
by the forefathers, and in which the Ninth Amendment clearly 
prohibits any denial or disparagement thereof;-
"The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights 
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others 
retained by the people.M 
What honest attorney or judge can fail to see that in the 
denial of Counsel of choice to a Defendant in court, that he is 
not "denying" or "disparaging" both enumerated and non-enumerated 
rights? 
And what honest attorney or judge can fail to see that in 
enforcing a so-called statute denying a layman the opportunity 
to speak in defense of a friend at the friend's request, that said 
lawyer or judge is rendering infidelity to his oath of office to 
support the Constitution, which states, in Article VI, Clause 2: 
"This Constitution, and the laws of the United States 
which shall be made in pursuance thereof,•..shall be 
the supreme law of the land; and the judges In every 
state shall be bound thereby, anything in the 
constitution or laws of any state to the contrary 
notwithstanding," 
Attorneys are called "officers of the court", and they are 
required to take oaths to support the Constitution. When the attorneys 
attempt to prevent the exercise of the rights of defendants in court 
to speak through lay friends of confidence, the attorneys are 
involved in denying that which they swear to uphold—to their 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
eternal discredit and dishonor. The fact that the attorneys have 
been successful for a long time, and that colleagues in judicial 
robes have upheld them, does not make it right; it does not make 
it Constitutional; and it certainly does not enhance the rights 
of"the grass roots American people who are tired of being subjected 
to exorbitant legal fees of a closed-shop union which says, "If you 
exercise your constitutional rights, we will see to it that you go 
to jail", and now, "You have to go our route because the loss of 
your Constitutional rights is a settled matter". 
How could any decent person uphold such a system? How can 
the legal and the judicial profession escape tarnished "images"? 
Is the denial of Constitutional Rights to the Defendant "frivolous"? 
Is it not better to restore Constitutional Rights than to have a 
restless people rise up? Must we have "government of attorneys, 
by attorneys, and for attorneys"? Especially, after Watergate, 
the people are not going to stand for it. 
It is important to note that the Sixth Amendment word "enjoy" 
follows the word "shall", and it would therefore be a command of 
the sovereign power that the ability to enjoy the right to counsel 
is mandatory. The words "shall.. .enjoy'1 make this very clear. 
The judgment as to what Counsel the Defendant can "enjoy" is 
left entirely in his hands and nowhere in the Sixth Amendment is 
this prerogative given to the Courts, but remains the "Right" of 
the Defendant. 
RIGHT: "n. Conformity to the will of God, or to His law, 
the perfect standard of truth and justice...Just 
claim; immunity; privilege. All men have the right 
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to the secure enjoyment of life, personal safety, 
liberty, and property. We deem the right of trial 
by jury invaluable, particularly in the case of 
crimes.11 
The "right" to "enjoy" Counsel is claimed by Defendant by 
law, nature, and tradition and may not be infringed or disparaged 
by any private association or its members or by its sympathizers 
employed in government. It is a right which the People retained 
for themselves and it is to be protected by their judiciary. It 
is not a function of the People's Courts, to protect the vested 
interests of any private monopoly as against the rights of The 
Sovereign People. Non-attorneys have as much right to speak for 
a Defendant in our Courts as attorneys. Otherwise, the Courts are 
run only for a "special interest" and are, in fact, protecting a 
monopoly in violation of the Sherman Anti-trust Law. Such a 
monopoly acts in the restraint of competition and trade, which 
would lower the cost of justice to The People. Attorneys could 
still ply their trade, but they would have to be competent and 
deserve more fully the business which they would acquire from those 
who voluntarily trusted them. 
ASSISTANCE: Mn. Help; aid; furtherance; succor; a 
contribution of support in bodily strength 
or other means.11 
The common understanding of the word assistance is that it 
comes from one in a secondary capacity. For example, assistance 
given a President by a Vice-President who "assists" him. And we 
find a definition of "assistant" which follows the word "assistance". 
The above mentioned dictionary defines an assistant as one who serves 
in a subordinate position as a helper. The common practice today of 
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the Defendant ••assisting" the Defense attorney is one to which 
Defendant objects. It is an erosion of the original right in 
which this motion in aimed at re-establishing. Defendant may 
also promote assistant Counsel to co-Counsel wherein they share 
in the defense and maintain that such a decision is theirs, not 
the Court's. It is theirs by Common Law and may not be denied or 
infringed upon by either the Courts or the bar association. It 
is also their Constitutional Right. 
COUNSEL: Mn. Advice; opinion or instruction,... Those who 
give counsel in law; any counselor or advocate, 
or any number of counselors, barristers, or Serjeants; 
as the plaintiff's counsel, or the defendant's • 
counsel." 
COUNSELOR: "n. Any person who gives advice;••• He who is 
consulted by a client in a lawcase; one who gives 
• advice in relation to a question of law; one whose 
profession is to give advice in law and manage 
causes for clients.'1 
If the men who framed the Bill of Rights meant by "COUNSEL" 
a licensed attorney, they would have said "licensed attorney". 
Surely the Court cannot refuse to recognize this, and in the 
interest of fairness, let it grant Defendant's motion. 
The President of the United States and every Governor who 
head the executive branches of government do not have to be 
"attorneys" in order to administer and enforce the law. Federal 
judges are not required by the Constitution, or by valid statute, 
to be "attorneys". Congressmen and Legislators who pass legislation, 
statutes1, and "laws" do not have to be "attorneys". Magistrates 
do not have to be "attorneys". Doesn't it seem strange that a 
Defendant can represent himself in Court without being an "attorney". 
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Why then, Defendant asks, must the Defendant's representative 
"in Court be an attorney? Why must the Defendant's representative 
need a title which the law-maker, the enforcer, the federal law-
adjudicator, and the Defendant himself do not need? Speak, oh 
Learned Ones! And please speak without attempting to make white 
"black", and black "white", as the graduates of law schools seem 
to be gifted at doing. And please speak without being in contempt 
of the Constitution of the United States. 
:,.- j • • • „. 
THE WILL OF THE SOVEREIGN POWER 
The United States Constitution is the will of The People, 
clearly set down for their agents elected and appointed, to follow. 
No law supercedes the U. S. Constitution and only those in "pursuance 
of it may stand. Even treaties must be "in pursuance" of the 
Constitution. •'. 
"We the people...do ordain and establish this 
Constitution for the United States of America." 
Preamble to the U. S. Constitution (1789). 
In establishing this government, the People said that: 
"This Constitution and the laws...made in pursuance 
thereof...shall be the supreme law of the land:..." 
Article VI, Sec. 2, U. S. Constitution. 
And they also commanded that: 
'"...All...Judicial officers, both of the United States 
and of the several states, shall be bound by oath or 
affirmation, to support this Constitution:..." 
Article VI, Sec. 3,"u. S. Constitution. 
It is clearly the will of the bar associations, not of the 
People, to close the Courts to all but licensed attorneys. Use of 
the word "Counsel" rather than "attorneys" denotes the will of the 
Sovereign Power, which cannot be lawfully overridden. 
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"In the United States, Sovereignty resides in the 
people, who act through the organs established by
 4 ^ 
the Constitution." Chisholm vs. Georgia, 2 Dall 
419, 471: Penhallow vs. Doane's Administrators, 3 
Dal 54, 93r McCullock vs. Maryland, 4 Wheat 316, 
404, 405; Yick vs. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370; 
M
...The Congress cannot invoke the sovereign power 
of the people to override their will as thus declared." 
Perry vs. United States, 294 E.S. 330, 353 (1935). 
The People declared their will as to the rights of the Accused 
in all criminal prosecutions in the Sixth Amendment, and the right 
of the Defendant to "enjoy" the "assistance of counsel" was 
purposely couched in the Common Law term "Counsel" so as to 
include those friends upon whom Defendants may depend for advice 
and protection• 
In a speech by Judge Learned Hand at the Mayflower Hotel in 
Washington, D. C , May 11, 1929, entitled, "Is There a Common Will?" 
in speaking of judges, he said: 
"He is to substitute even his juster will for theirs; 
• otherwise it would not be the 'common will1 which 
prevails, and to that extent the people would not 
govern." 
Defendant has the right to be foolish as well as wise, and 
his liberty is his to do with as he pleases. To deny him his 
freedom of choice in this matter of counsel is to unduly interfere 
with the defense, and constitutes a denial of the will of The 
People, from whom the Courts1 authority is derived, and a sub-
stitution in lieu thereof is beinq used that of the "will of 
attorneys". 
"Bills of rights are, in their origin, reservations of 
rights not surrendered to the prince." Hamilton, 
Federalist Papers, No. 84. 
The right to have a "friend" plead one's case or to assist 
one in Court, is a Common Law right secured in the Sixth Amendment. 
.c\ 
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"History is clear that the first ten amendments to the 
Constitution were adopted to secure certain common law 
rights of the people, against invasion by the Federal 
Government.M Bell vs. Hood, 71 F. Supp., 813, 816 
(1947) U.S.D.C. ~ So. Dist, Calif. 
Our forefathers spoke and wrote in the vernacular of the 
Common Law, and "counsel" was the word they chose. The facts are 
conclusive on this point, and the record supports this contention. 
Interpretation of the word McounselH to mean "attorney only" is a 
departure from the safeguards of the Bill of Rights. 
"The Bill of Rights was provided as a barrier, to 
protect the individual against arbitrary exactions of... 
legislatures, (and) courts...it is the primary 
distinction between democratic and totalitarian way." 
Re Stoller, Supreme Court of Florida/ en banc, 36 SO. 
2nd 44, 445 (1948). 
A more recent confirmation of Constitutional rights of the 
Accused says: 
"Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, 
there can be no rule-making or legislation which would 
abrogate them." Miranda vs. Arizona, 384 U.S. 456. 
Even though the Miranda decision referred to the Fifth 
Amendment right in toto, the above stated principle is of general 
application, wherein the word "rights" is not qualified. 
II 
DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 
In Tarlowski, supra, the Court said, in suppressinq evidence 
at the request of motion, of Tarlowski; 
MWhen a federal officials interference with the right 
of free association, takes the form of limiting the 
* ability of a criminal suspect to consult with and be 
accompanied by a person upon whom, he relies for advice 
and protection, he gravely transgresses. For these 
reasons, the Motion to suppress must be granted." 
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It was in this case that Tarlowski was denied the counsel 
of an accountant, not of a lawyer. 
Defendant has a right under the First Amendment to freely 
associate with whom he pleases in his defense and in its preparation 
and presentation, so long as such is respectful, with decorum and 
lack of contempt for orderly rules of procedure which do not deprive 
one of Constitutional Rights. 
To deny this Right is also to deny his Fifth Amendment Right 
to Due Process, which is actually a guarantee of fundamental 
fairness. 
Ill • 
DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO PETITION FOR REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES , .  
The First Amendment states, in pertinent part: 
"Congress shall make no law respecting...the right 
of the people...to petition the government for redress 
of grievances." 
Defendant asks, MHow can I maintain my maximum right to 
petition for redress of grievances if that person whom I choose to 
speak for me is not permitted to do so?" 
If Congress passes a statute requiring a Federal Court to 
abide a statute of the State in which it sits, and said statute 
of -a State purports to make it a crime for a Defendant to be 
represented by a non-attorney, then Congress has effectively not 
only done what the Constitution does not authorize, but it has 
done what is expressly forbidden. 
If such is the case. Congress has made a MlawM frustrating 
the right of The People, and the Defendant therein, Mto petition 
for redress of grievances". 
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Of what use is the right to petition for Redress of 
Grievances if Defendant is personally handicapped to the extent 
that he needs assistance in his petitioning, and yet the Defendant 
is limited by a bar association, or a State, or a Court who says 
that a competent "friend" cannot be permitted to speak for the 
Petitioner because said "friend" has not been brain washed in 1 
» 
certain "approved" law schools where deprivation of the petitioner's j 
Constitutional Rights, although set forth in plain and unambiguous I 
language in the Constitution itself, was not "settled doctrine". j 
The "licensed attorneys' and "attorney-judges" say that "The j 
Constitution is what the Supreme Court says itis". What if the 
Congress passes a law saying that any bureaucrat can rape any 
layman's wife, and the Supreme Court says, "Yes, that's perfectly 
in harmony with the Constitution"? 
Then, are we The People to stand for it? Who gave them said 
authority? Now, what should The People do who have such a Congress 
and such a Supreme Court? Are the lower Court judges brave enough 
to challenge it, or are they "bound" to follow the higher Court 
judges? 
^ And where is the member of the bar, the licensed "attorney", 
who now steps forward and announces that the Supreme Court is 
mistaken? Where does his license go to? Now, who is qoinq to 
permit him to appear in Court if he doesn't buckle down and stop 
rocking the establishment? 
Obviously, an extreme example has been used; but it is 
significant. Laymen would not have to stand for such nonsense. 
Licensed "attorneys" who knows? 
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That laymen should be subjected to a "drifting1' and "unstable" 
.Constitution—which happens to be what some justices "think it is 
at the moment—can be very frustrating, and that a jury cannot hear 
••counsel11 not beholden to such damnable floating doctrine is indeed 
a-denial of "the Right to Petition (effectively) for Redress of 
Grievances". To preserve justice, to preserve the semblance of a 
fair trial and an impartial jury, let the Defendant petition for 
Redress of Grievances, to the jury, through "counsel of his choice" 
who is not beholden to a corrupt and degenerate system which has 
perverted the very law by which it pretends to rule and which it 
pretends to protect and uphold. 
Defendant believes that true religion guarantees freedom of 
choice, or freedom to choose, and elect, and to select, taking the 
responsibility of the consequences of said choices. 
Defendant further believes that he has the right to help 
others, and, in turn, to be helped by those willing to voluntarily 
answer his call for assistance. In this case, he particularly means 
in the Courtroom where a hostile government is violating its own 
law and trampling upon the Riqhts of the Sovereign People, which 
its officers are sworn to protect. 
When all the mighty force of ail powerful government is 
arrayed against a lone individual who has the courage to point out 
the government's inequities, said individual should be entitled 
most of all, to the protection of his religious convictions and 
rights. 
Under the First Amendment, the right of conscience and the 
right to believe, as long as the same does not trample upon the 
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rights of another, is the number one right protected by government. 
In pertinent part, the First Amendment states: 
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment 
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof...'1 
Defendant's religious conviction, again, calls for freedom 
from oppression and freedom from soul stifling special interest 
legislation slapped on a freedom loving individual on behalf of 
self-serving perpetrators of special advantages to the legal 
profession at the expense of the long suffering victims of the 
same. Let the legal profession compete like men with the Counsel 
Defendant needs for his defense, and for the pcoper exercise of 
his religious Rights, chief among which is the freedom of choice 
which does not trample upon the Rights of another. 
IV 
DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION 
Defendant's right to equal protection of the laws is 
guaranteed through the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment: 
"The due process clause of the Fifth Amendment 
guarantees to each citizen the equal protection of 
the laws and prohibits a denial thereof by any 
Federal official." Boiling vs. Sharpe, 327 U.S. 497 
Defendant asks the Court to take Judicial Notice of Exhibit 
"A" attached hereto. It is an article from Newsweek, September 2, 
1974, which tells how a layman, James Yager, handled the legal 
problems of 3500 clients (see para 1). The same paragraph also 
speaks of "His most recent court appearance11, which "took place 
in Atlanta". It describes how "Yager paced the courtroom floor", 
as he addressed the jury. Mr. Yager is engaging in the practice 
of law, which is his Right as a Layman, or laymen, to assist him 
in his defense, if they so desire. To deny this motion is to give Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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prisoners more Rights than to a Free and Natural Person. Such 
inequity before the law is intolerable. 
Said Article mentions various others who have adopted law as 
an avocation and goes on to mention in the article a Mr* Green, ~" 
another former inmate now on parole, and says that "Green is a 
familiar face in the Boston courtrooms, where he maintains his 
legal activities by submitting amicus briefs for other felons." 
It would be interesting to know if Mr. Green and Yeager, like 
Mr. Jefferson and James X, are also black men, and if therefore/ 
Constitutional Rights are only for black men. 
In both United Mine Workers vs. Illinois Bar Association, 
389 U.S. 217, and NAACP vs. Button, 371 U.S. 415, and also in 
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen vs. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 
1 (1964)9 it was held that a State may not pass statutes prohibiting 
the unauthorized practice of law or to interfere with the Right to 
freedom of speech, secured in the First Amendment. 
Defendant is entitled to equal protection of the laws and 
that includes his right to speak through whom he pleases, when he 
pleases. The only reasonable condition is that the decorum of the 
Court and the rules not in conflict with individual rights be 
maintained; otherwise there can be no valid denial of this inalienable 
and legal Right. Defendant is agreed to this, and has every intention 
of obeying the proper rules and maintaining the decorum of the Court. 
To do otherwise is unthinkable. 
Defendant herein also believes that it is vital to his defense 
to seek whatever assistance he has confidence in, and that if he 
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decides to be assisted by either licensed or unlicensed Counsel, 
he has the Right to do so. If Defendant believes that a combination 
of both may be to his advantage, to deny him this Right would 
constitute an unreasonable and arbitrary interference with his 
defense, by denying him his Constitutional Right to freely associate 
with whom he chooses; to his freedom of speech; to his freedom to 
Petition for Redress of Grievances; and for his religious Right of 
conscience and freedom of choice, without which religion is worth 
but little. 
Defendant also asks the Court to take Judicial Notice that 
other Defendants in criminal cases are allowed to plan their 
defenses minus interference by the Courts, and Defendant herein 
claims that same Right. 
Surely we cannot have special laws for attorneys and special 
grants of privilege to them as a class, which are denied all other 
citizens. The Constitutional prohibition on titles of nobility in 
Article I, Section 9, clause 8, is violated when "attorney" becomes 
a title of special Drivilege, i.e. Mnobility,,. We must all have 
equal access to the Courts. Presently, only those attorneys have 
access to the Courts whom the Courts approve and as a result, all 
"approved" attorneys are considered Officers of the Court. Where 
does the defendant go who does not wish to be defended by an Officer 
of the Court? To use the power of the Court to force the defense 
into using an Officer of the Court at the defense table offends the 
sensibilities of the Defendant to the very core. Defendant may wish 
to voluntarily select an attorney among his Counsel, but this 
Defendant believes that he should not be forced to do so. Defendant 
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is simply seeking freedom of choice in the matter of whether he has 
no Counsel and represents himself or uses legal Counsel (attorney), 
mixed Counsel (attorneys and laymen) or lay Counsel only. 
The "stealthy encroachment" upon Defendant's Right to Counsel 
not -licensed by the Bar is the result of a monopoly of the legal 
establishment, both in and out of government. State and Federal, to 
"protect" their "price fixing"; to maintain artificially high legal 
fees; to educate the chosen few in law schools maintained largely at 
public expense; to protect attorneys from competition from those who 
know that attorneys have preverted the Constitution and left the 
People at the mercy of a swarm of bureaucrats with endless attorney 
promoted regulations and laws which make the exercise of natural and 
Constitutionally protected Rights, "crimes", wherein, the attorney 
controlled government can prosecute the Sovereign Citizen and force 
him into the waiting, outstretched arms of his attorney brotherhood, 
who will "advise" and "defend" him for a considerable fee. 
Little wonder that People are fed up with the profession when 
it is full of licensed "Haldimans, Erlichmans, Mitchells, and Deans". 
Little wonder many peoole almost vomit when contemplating that which 
attorneys have done to this once mighty, powerful, and mdependant 
Republic. 
Legal fees come too hiqh for many average citizens. Yet the 
same average citizen cannot turn to laymen who may be well-versed 
in the necessary legal area and this restricts the Courts to attorneys 
and those who can afford them. Laymen who cannot afford attorneys 
must suffer along as best they can. It is as unjust a system as one 
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could conjure up. Of course some persons can qualify for a Public 
Defender. That is like being alone in a pit of cobras and someone 
comes along and wants to throw in another cobra. Under those 
circumstances, what is needed is a mongoose, (Counsel of Choice), 
not-another cobra. Perhaps the STAR CHAMBERS weren't so bad after 
all. . :' :-,,.,, ^ ,,_ .., .__,.. 
y ' ' v , • • * - : • • • • - : A - . . , : 
DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF SPEECH 
Defendant has not only the Right to speak for himself, but also 
to speak through whom he pleases. This is inherent in the First 
Amendment Right to freedom of speech. It is also, self-evident, as 
a part of the Natural Rights Doctrine, and among those Rights called 
inherent and inalienable outlined in the Declaration of Independence, 
which antecedes all government, and which are natural or God-given, 
rather than government-given rights. Defendant points out that he 
does not claim any "attorney-given" rights, but suggests his God 
given Natural Rights not be infringed upon. 
This fundamental Right of freedom of soeech has been referred, 
to previously but Defendant wishes to set it out separately to 
emphasize it to the Court and herein refers again to United Mine 
Workers vs. Illinois Bar Association, supra, NAACP vs. Button, supra, 
and the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen vs. Virqmia State Bar, 
supra, in support of said Right. 
It is indicative that the words in the First Amendment embrace 
freedom "of" speech, and not just freedom "to" speak, and while 
Defendant does not wish to prolong this Brief by a detailed discussion 
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of the difference, he simply wishes to bring to the Court's attention 
that there is a difference and its application is obvious. 
VI 
DENIAL OF FREEDOM OF COUNSEL WOULD RESULT 
IN A CONFLICT OF INTEREST 
Defendant's request for the Court to recognize his Right to 
non-attorney Counsel, in lieu of, or in addition to, attorney-
counsel, would mean that the Court would have to rule during trial 
on a motion regarding Defendant's Right to non-attorney assistance, 
including that of assistant spokesman. 
If the Honorable Court has in the past ever been a member of 
any Bar Association, or is at present a member of a bar, or has 
close friends or associates connected with a Bar Association, then 
Defendant finds it difficult to see how the Court could possibly 
render an unprejudiced and impartial ruling on Defendant's motion 
regarding his right to non-attorney counsel. 
It appears to Defendant that the Court would find itself at 
variance with his own standards, mainly on the Cannons of Judicial 
Ethics, No. 29, which state: 
"A judge should abstain from performing or taking part in 
any judicial act in which his personal interests are 
involved. If he has a personal litiqation in the court 
{ of which he is judge, he need not resign his judqeship on 
that account, but he should, of course, refrain from any 
judicial act in such controversy." 
It is apparent to Defendant that the denial of Defendant's 
motion herein would call for the thinking, on the part of most 
reasonable persons, that the denial was based, at least in part, on 
a conflict of interest, and upon a "hardship of the case'1 meaning 
upon the unfortunate Bar Associations. 
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Granting the motion, however, could not be interpreted as being 
iYi conflict of interest, but rather, despite personal interest and 
in favor of fairness, due process, and the justice to which the 
Sovereign Citizen of this Republic is entitled under the Sixth 
Amendment. 
VII 
FEDERAL COURT'S ENFORCEMENT OF PRACTICE OF LAW 
STATE STATUTE IS CIRCUMVENTION OF FIRST, NINTH, 
AND TENTH AMENDMENTS 
The Tenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States: 
MThe powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are 
reserved to the States, respectively, or to the people." 
The power to abrogate the Rights mentioned herein, heretofore, 
has not been delegated to the United States or any State through 
the Constitution. 
Nothing in the Constitution of the State of Utah constitutes 
a delegation of power to the State to thwart and frustrate the 
foregoing Rights; freedom of speech, of religion, of assembly, of 
petitioning for redress of grievances, of due process, of Right to 
contract, and of equal treatment under the law. 
Therefore, the foregoing assumed as true, the "power" remains 
with the people, who are the Sovereiqn in this country as heretofore 
pointed out. Therefore, the Defendant retains the power for his 
choice of, a spokesman in Court, "anything in the Constitution or 
laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding". Regardless of 
Utah's statutes or any arbitray rule making, it cannot invalidate 
Defendant's Natural Rights protected by the Constitution. Said 
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pretended right to "regulate" the "practice of lawM must fall or 
recede when put alongside the Defendant's right to a fair trial by 
an impartial jury, with due process, freedom of speech, and contract 
as heretofore pointed out. 
• It is impossible to delegate to another that which the delegator 
does not himself possess. Defendant does not have the right to compel 
the inadequate representation of another, and, therefore, this 
Defendant is powerless to delegate such a tyrannical power to a 
legislature, whether or not controlled by attorneys or a Bar 
Association. 
To summerize the foregoing, the Tenth Amendment prohibits 
the State of Utah and its Courts from restricting Defendant's right 
for a non-attorney spokesman in court. Such power is not given the 
State in either the United States or State Constitutions. Therefore, 
in civil cases, the Legislature has usurped, at the prodding of 
attorneys, the so-called Right to institute a statute prohibiting 
a Defendant, in a prosecution against him by his government, from 
relying upon a preferred ^ okesman of trust and confidence. In 
criminal cases there is no valid reason, statute, or Court ruling 
that can alter the fundamental right to Counsel, and the Courts, in 
denying said spokesman, are arbitrarily usurping Defendant's Right. 
The Ninth Amendment reserves all non-enumerated Riahts. They 
are not to be denied or disparaged, though not enumerated. The 
mention ar\d enumeration of the Right to Counsel under the Supreme 
authority of the Sixth Amendment cannot be construed to deny or 
disparage the Right to said Counsel being a non-attorney, or a non-
member of a Bar Association licensed to only plea bargain and lose. 
- >"• 
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It would appear that any decent person would have no difficulty 
agreeing with the above, and that any other ruling would indeed be 
"frivolous" and without Constitutional authority. 
Again/ the imposing of restriction on Defendant's Counsel 
violates and circumvents Defendant's Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment 
Rights. In addition, it imposes cruel and unusual punishment upon 
the Defendant by forcing him to seek legal assistance, when and if 
he needs it, from those whom he either does not trust or cannot 
afford. 
VII 
DENIAL OF NON-ATTORNEY COUNSEL VIOLATES CIVIL RIGHTS 
Denial of Defendant's desire for a non-attorney of his choice 
is also a deprivation of his Civil Rights under the color of law in 
violation of Defendant's Rights under 42 USC 1983, 1985, and 1986 
(see Owens vs. the City of Independence). 
CONCLUSION - : 
Any denial of Counsel is an attempt to accomplish that which . 
is specifically prohibited by the Sixth Amendment. The Right set 
down therein says nothing about only "court-approved counsel", and 
is in no way qualified. 
The U. S. Supreme Court held, in Miller vs. Milwaukee, 272 
U.S. 713, 715, that if a statute is part of an unlawful scheme to 
reach a prohibited result, M...the statute must fall..." This was 
again upheld in McCallen vs. Massachusetts, 279 U.S. 620, 630.
 F 
Legislators, neither Federal nor State, may restrict the Courts 
-28- ii* 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
to "attorneys only" in order to effectively deny Counsel to any 
Defendant who evinces a desire to be represented or assisted by 
a
 "friend" in preference to an "attorney". What cannot be done 
by the front door cannot be lawfully done by way of the back door. 
• Legislators who pass laws do not have to be attorneys nor do 
those who execute the law, i.e.# Sheriffs, Governors, Presidents, 
etc. Even the Justices of the U. S. Supreme Court need not be 
licensed attorneys. To exclude the People from defending their 
"friends" in the Courts turns the said Courts into a playground 
for the legal establishment, and is a blatant violation of 
Defendant's Right to Counsel, due process of law; and equal 
protection under the law. Mr. Justice Brandeis said: 
"Discrimination is the act of treating differently two 
persons or things under like circumstances.11 National 
Life Ins. Co., vs. United States, 277 U.S. 508, 630 
As far back as 1886, the U. S. Supreme Court was concerned 
with the unjust and illegal discriminations which were running 
rampant. The Court frowned upon law administered with an "unequal 
hand" , 
"•..so as practically to make unjust and illegal 
discrimination between persons in similar circumstances 
material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is 
still within the prohibition of the Constitution." Yic"\ 
Wo vs. Hopkins, supra 
Therefore, the Courts cannot be the exclusive territory of the 
legal "elite corps" but must be open to all the Sovereign People 
alike--on <an equal basis. 
The Ninth and Tenth Amendments also prohibit the denial of 
Counsel of choice. Nowhere has Defendant or his predecessors 
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delegated such restrictive power to the United States or to the 
States, and if the Court will closely examine the Ninth and Tenth 
Amendments, it will find that the Right to Counsel of choice, such 
as Defendant herein claims, is also secured in the penumbra of 
these Amendments, particularly the Ninth, which is protected in 
the States (against "practice of law" statutes) by the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Roe vs. Wade, 41 L.W. 4213 (1973): Shapiro vs. U.S. 641, 
394 U.S. 618 (1966); Griswold vs. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1964). 
In speaking of controlling Constitutional law as opposed to 
mere statute law, Chief Justice Marshall said: 
"Those then, who controvert this principle, that the 
Constitution is to be considered, in court as a 
paramount law, are reduced to the necessity of main-
taining that courts must close their eyes on the 
Constitution and see only the law." 
And the Court concluded that: 
"This doctrine would subvert the very foundation of all 
written constitutions." Marbury vs. Madison, 5 US 137, 176 
The United States Supreme Court also pointed out in this 
decision that in declaring what should be the supreme law of the 
land, the Constitution itself was first mentioned and "...not the 
laws of the United States generally...". 
The attorneys who sit in our State Legislatures and our Congress 
have no right to pass laws which infringe or abolish our rights 
under the Constitution of the United States and such unconstitutional 
laws which purports to do so must be declared null and void (Miranda 
vs. Arizona, p. Supra, p. 491) and not binding upon the Courts. 
Dated this day of ,19 . 
1A 
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/ / / - ' 
Respectfully Submitted, 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I# the undersigned, do hereby certify that I hand delivered 
a true and correct copy of .the foregoing document on this 
day of , 19 , to 
at . _____ _________ . 
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ADDENDUM B 
APPELLANT'S APPEAL BRIEF TO THIRD 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
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Myron A. Hamilton 
9429 South 1300 West 
Township 3 S R 1 W 
Salt Lake County, Utah 84065 
IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
Plaintiff ) Case No. 83 TFSY 493 
vs. ) Appeal No. 
MYRON A. HAMILTON ) 
) APPEAL BRIEF 
Accused/Appellant ) 
COMES NOW the Defendant to move the District Court to reverse 
the conviction of the Defendant in the instant case for the follow-
ing causes. 
I 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Defendant was found guilty of failure to obey a police officer, 
interference with a public servant, failure to respond to officers 
signal, speeding, and no driver's license on person. The Defendant 
was acquitted of improper display of license plates and assault on a 
police officer. 
The Prosecution insisted upon moving forward in a jury trial 
over the oojection of the Defendant. The Defendant refused to plead, 
challenged the jurisdiction and demanded all of his Rights. 
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The Defendant was summarily arraigned befor Judge David Brown. 
The Defendant entered no plea whatsoever and did not understand any 
of the alleged charges that had been brought by Officer Shane Smith. 
Defendant was arrested November 5, 1984 and booked into the Salt Lake 
County Jail as a John Doe. The arresting officer new full well the 
name of the Defendant. There were some 9 charges brought against 
the Defendant, some of which, apparently, the prosecuting attorney 
and the officers in question dismissed. Officer Shane Smith apparent-
* 
ly gave the Defendant a life sentence in jail for he failed to take 
the Defendant to any magistrate to be arraigned. The Defendant had 
to secure a Writ of Habeas Corpus to be released from the Salt Lake 
County Jail on November 7th. 
The case was transferred from Judge David Brown's jurisdiction 
to a Circuit Judge by the name of Bailey Sainsbury to be heard in 
Sandy. A notice of arraignment was scheduled for January 11, 1984, 
befor Judge Sainsbury. A Motion for Dismissal was forwarded to 
Judge Sainsbury challenging any and all jurisdiction over this matter. 
The Court denied the dismissal and proceeded further with the arraign-
ment. A Motion for Discovery under Rule 16(B) was entered upon the 
court and the prosecuting attorney on December 19, 1983. The proceed-
ings at the arraignment hearing and Motion for Dismissal Due to Incom-
plete Discovery was entered. It was denied by the Judge along with 
the dismissal. A Motion for Counsel of Choice was entered upon the 
court on the 11th of January and a brief in support thereof. A Notice 
and Demand for Veniremen to Number 12 was also introduced along with 
a Notice and Demand for Rights Sua Sponte. All were denied by the 
court. 
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The Defendant had to notice up a motion hearing for the 6th of 
February at which time the prosecuting attorney, Barbara Byrne, was 
present to answer why Defendant had not been awarded proper discovery. 
The Defendant fully intended to have depositions taken from arresting 
officers and the court of its own volition denied the accused the 
right to have depositions taken. The court of its own volition denied 
the Defendant any further information than what had been granted by 
the prosecuting attorney, at which time a Motion for the Plaintiff 
to Show Constraining Need, a Motion and Demand For Time, Motion for 
a Public Prosecutor and a Motion for Severance of Offenses were all 
denied by the court. All of the alleged offenses that had been charged 
against the Defendant other than the speeding were brought against 
the Defendant after a release from the officer and then without any 
probable cause stated, the officer entered upon private property and 
using a lethal, deadly weapon, took the Defendant under arrest stating 
no charges whatsoever. 
All of the alleged charges brought against the Defendant at this 
scene stemmed from the illegal arrest, search and seizure of the 
Defendant without probable cause. Yet the Judge denied the Motion 
for Severance of Offensed. 
The Defendant entered 5 new motions on February 9, one for 
Subpoena, a second Demand for Time and two others for depositions to 
be taken and one for the prosecuting attorney to bring forth the radar 
equipment used in the arrest, all of which were denied by the court. 
II 
The court has at every meaningful hearing along with the officers, 
jailers and/or magistrate Brown denied the Defendant to have assistance 
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of counsel for his defense. The Defendant was only granted 6 sub-
poenas when there were at least 5 of his own family that had to be 
subpoenaed; therefore, the Defendant was fettered in his defense. 
Under Rule 14 the Defendant is entitled to an unlimited supply of 
subpoenas for his defense. The prosecuting attorney entered the 
radar as admissible evidence after it had been denied as evidence 
to the defense. The prosecuting attorney was allowed to use it as 
evidence. 
The arresting officers did secure evidence from the Driver's 
License Department that the Defendant had a valid Utah drivers license. 
The court denied the Defendant to a grand jury indictment and a 
public prosecutor to prosecute this action. The court denied the 
Defendant a common law jury as guaranteed to him by the Seventh 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Magna Carta, 
(Article II Paragraph 2.) 
The Trial Judge did not seem to understand the difference between 
a "lawyer to represent," and a "counsel to act and advise." 
The Defendant was openly denied counsel of any kind. Defendant 
was present and his counsel was present and ready to aid the Defendant 
but was forbidden to act or counsel the Defendant. 
The Trial Judge sentenced the Defendant to 56 days in jail. This 
was done in violation of Argersinger vs. Hamlin, 407 U. S. 25: "Under 
the rule we announce today, every judge will know when the trial of 
a misdemeanor starts that no imprisonment may be imposed, even though 
local law permits it, unless the accused is represented by counsel." 
Defendant moves for dismissal pursuant to the Trial Court1s 
error in denying the Defendant Unfettered counsel of choice. 
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I*1 
THE PROSECUTING ATTORNEY ISSUE 
The Salt Lake County Prosecutor prosecuted the case in the 
name of the State of Utah. 
The County Attorneys have no power to prosecute a criminal 
action it must be done by a public prosecutor in the name of the 
people of the State of Utah. What have we done with the people? 
How far can the Government supress them before they rebel. 
Governments have powers not rights. The County is a Corpora-
tion under the State and does not have the power to prosecute a 
criminal case any more than Boise Cascade Corporation or Kennecott 
Copper Corporation, or Albertson's Inc. does in a Criminal Case. 
Powers not granted are prohibited,(Article X U.S. Const.) 
Please refer to the rocord and see "MOTION FOR PUBLIC PROSECUTION 
OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE TO DISMISS" and the Brief in support thereof. 
IV 
DEMURRER DEMAND FOR DISMISSAL 
The Traffic Courts routinely dismiss all constitutional issues. 
This citizen is claiming right. "Where rights are involved there 
can be no rule making or legislation which could abrogate them 
"Miranda vs. Arizona 384 U.S. 436 at 491. 
Please refer to my "Writ of Error, Notice and Demand for Counsel, 
Notice and Demand for Veneremen to Number 12, Motion for Subpoena 
Duces Tecutn, Motion for Subpoena, Jurisdiction, and Duties. 
V 
THE MAJOR FEDERAL QUESTION 
The fin^l question and perhaps the most significant question 
is whether or not this person can be arrested on his own private 
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property without a warrant having never been given any reason for 
the arrest. The officers beat and kicked the Accused to a state of 
unconsciousness, dragging him some 500 yards, paralizing his arms, 
beating him about the head and face. The officer using deadly force 
in the unlawful arrest and unlawful detention. The officers never 
took the Defendant to a Magistrate according to Utah Code 77-7-23. 
Instead they gave the Defendant a life sentence in the county jail 
without a hearing of any kind before ^ ny Magistrate, when one lived 
just next door to the Accused. 
A Civil action has been initiated in the U.S. District Court 
to settle the discrepancy between the arresting officers, the jailers, 
the prosecutor and the Judge that tried this action. The Judge Bailey 
Sainsbury, after being served with a copy of the complaint and a 
summons, still proceeded to prosecute this action, being a Defendant 
in a civil case in the U.S. District Court, case number 84-148W. 
May I suggest that in the interest of judicial expediency and 
exonomy that this case and all charges pertaining to it, be over-
turned by the District Court. 
Dated this / Y day of J^/yf^i^ , 1984. 
Respectfully submitted. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
MYRON A, HAMILTON, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. CRA-84-12 
This matter comes before the Court on appeal from a jury 
trial presided over by the Honorable C . Bailey Sainsbury in 
the Fifth Circuit Court, Sandy Department, on the 27th and 28th 
days of February, 1 9 8 4 . During the trial the defendant pled 
guilty to having no drivers license on his person, and the jury 
found him guilty of failure to obey a police officer; failure 
to respond to an officer's signal to stop; speeding; and interference 
with a public servant. The jury found him not guilty of improper 
display of license plates, and of assault on a police officer. 
The defendant appeals from these convictions on various grounds, 
some of which are not very clear from d e f e n d a n t ' s p l e a d i n g s . 
The basic facts are that on the 5th day of November, 1983 
at approximately 6:34 p.m. in the area of 350 West 10600 South, 
Officer Smith observed a white Chevrolet pickup with no visible 
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He checked the speed on radar, and the uni t indicated the pickup 
was t r a v e l i n g 51 mph in a r e s i d e n t i a l area . The Officer turned 
on h i s overhead l i g h t s at approximately 900 West and 10600 South, 
but the v e h i c l e f a i l e d to r e s p o n d . The O f f i c e r then turned 
on h i s s p o t l i g h t to get the d r i v e r ' s a t t e n t i o n , but the v e h i c l e 
did not s t o p . I t f i n a l l y stopped at 1300 West and 10550 South. 
As the O f f i c e r approached the v e h i c l e , a verba l a l t e r c a t i o n 
occurred, and the Officer asked the dr iver to produce h i s l i c e n s e . 
The dr iver re fused , and the O f f i c e r informed him t h a t he was 
under a r r e s t , and reques ted t h a t he s t ep out of the v e h i c l e . 
The dr iver re fused , and sped north in h i s v e h i c l e . The Off icer 
pursued, with h i s l i g h t s and s i r e n a c t i v a t e d . The pickup turned 
into a d i r t l ane a t a p p r o x i m a t e l y 9450 South 1300 West, and 
drove through an open g a t e . The young man jumped from the truck, 
c losed the g a t e , and locked i t . The Off icer entered the property 
with a shotgun, and demanded that the dr iver e x i t from the v e h i c l e 
and place h i s hands on the t r u c k . O f f i c e r Smith then asked 
Officer Foster to handcuff the d r i v e r . The driver pul led away, 
and indicated that she wasn't man enough to handcuff him. Off icer 
Smith then proceeded to handcuff the defendant, and a s t r u g g l e 
ensued, and O f f i c e r s Gary Cox and Gene Wallace a r r i v e d , and 
a s s i s t e d in subduing the d e f e n d a n t . They then proceeded to 
transport the defendant to the p o l i c e v e h i c l e , but a s t r u g g l e 
ensued a t t h e c l o s e d g a t e , and t h e defendant and the Officer 
4 7' 
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f e l l to the ground. A verbal a l t e rca t ion ensued, a t which time 
the defendant y e l l e d , w p o l i c e b r u t a l i t y . H The defendant was 
then carr ied to the po l i ce vehicle and s t r a p p e d i n , and taken 
to the Sa l t Lake county J a i l , where he demanded to be taken 
before a magistrate immediately. For further f ac t s and d e t a i l s 
on the lega l p roceed ings p lease refer to the b r i e f s f i led by 
the p l a i n t i f f and d e f e n d a n t . The Court having reviewed the 
p l e a d i n g s , the t r a n s c r i p t and the b r ie f s f i l ed by the p a r t i e s , 
f inds and rules as fol lows: 
1 . The defendant requested the Court appoint him counsel 
of h i s choice, being a person who had not been admitted to pract ice 
law before the Courts of the s t a te of Utah. This Court finds 
t ha t Judge Sainsbury did not commit error in refusing to appoint 
such counsel for an individual who is not permitted to pract ice 
law in the s t a t e of Utah without a l i c e n s e . I t i s a l so not 
a d e n i a l of the d e f e n d a n t ' s Sixth Amendment r i g h t s where the 
court refuses to pe rmi t a non-lawyer to a c t as h i s counse l . 
See, Utah Code Ann., Section 78-51-25 (1953 as amended); U.S. v. 
Kelly, 539 F.2d 1199; U.S. v. Jordan, 508 F.2d 750. 
2. The defendant contends that the County At torney ' s Office 
i s not1 the proper o f f ice to prosecute a case of t h i s type, and 
they cannot prosecute the case on behalf of the people of the 
S t a t e of Utah. The Cons t i tu t ion of the S ta t e of Utah, and the 
Utah s t a tu t e s e x p l i c i t l y provide the County Attorney is a public 
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prosecutor, and they are required to prosecute and conduct on 
behalf of the State of Utah all prosecutions for public offenses 
committed within the County* See# the Utah Constitution, Art. 8, 
Section 10; Utah Code Annotated, Section 17-18-1 (1953 as amended). 
3. The defendant suggests that he could only be arrested 
upon the issuance of an arrest warrant, and therefore the arrest 
by the officers was illegal. The Utah law provides that a peace 
officer may make a warrantless arrest where a public offense 
is committed in his presence, and a public offense is defined 
as including a misdemeanor. See, Utah Code Ann., Section 77-7-2, 
and Oleson v. Pincock, 68 Utah 507, 251 P. 23. An officer is 
not required to inform the defendant, or give him notice of 
intention to cause an arrest, or his authority for the arrest 
when the person being arrested is actively engaged in the commission 
of the offense, or is pursued immediately after the commission 
of such an offense. See, Utah Code Ann., Section 77-7-6 (1953 
as amended. An officer may follow a defendant onto his private 
property and effect the arrest when the offense was committed 
in their presence, and they are in fresh pursuit of the suspect. 
See, Kerr v. California, 374 U.S. 23. There is no merit to 
defendants contention that he was held for an unnecessary length 
of time before being taken before a magistrate for arraignment. 
It is not unusual to be arrested on a Saturday, v/hich the defendant 
'7 
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was, and be held unt i l the fo l lowing Monday when the c o u r t i s 
in session. 
4 . The defendant a l l e g e s t h a t he was prejudiced by the 
Court only allowing the i ssuance of s ix subpoenas , but y e t he 
f a i l s t o s t a t e who he would have subpoenaed, and what further 
evidence he might have brought in , and how he was p r e j u d i c e d . 
The court in i t s wisdom f e l t that the defendant may try to make 
a mockery of the j u d i c i a l system, and t h e r e f o r e e x e r c i s e d h i s 
d i s c r e t i o n , and l i m i t e d the number of subpoenas that would be 
i s s u e d . See, Utah Code Ann., Sect ion 77-35-33. 
5 . The defendant a l s o c h a r g e s that h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
r i g h t s were v io la ted when he was not allowed to have a twelve-man 
jury . The Utah Code Annotated, Sect ion 78-46-5 (1953 as amended) 
provides that in non-capital c a s e s j u r i e s may number l e s s than 
t w e l v e . This has been upheld in the case of S a l t Lake City 
v . West G a l l e r y , I n c . , 573 P.2d 1283. The U.S. Supreme Court 
in the c a s e of Wil l iams v . F lor ida , 399 U.S. 78, held that i t 
was not a v i o l a t i o n of an i n d i v i d u a l ' s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t 
to t r i a l by j u r y . The defendant a l so contends that there was 
i n s u f f i c i e n t evidence to f ind him g u i l t y beyond a r e a s o n a b l e 
d o u b t . He makes some broad a l l e g a t i o n s that he was denied a 
subpoena duces tecum in not being allowed to inspect the radar 
gun , t h a t he was den ied a due process of law, tfiat there was 
prejudice and b i a s , and that he received cruel and unusual punish-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STATE V. HAMILTON PAGE SIX MEMORANDUM DECISION 
merit, but he f a i l s to show how the e v i d e n c e was i n s u f f i c i e n t , 
or how he was d e n i e d any of h i s r i g h t s , or how he was p r e j u d i c e d 
by the d e n i a l of t h e s e r i g h t s . When t h e d e f e n d a n t f i l e d for 
an a p p e a l , he had t h e burden of showing t h a t t h e e v i d e n c e was 
i n s u f f i c i e n t , and t h a t r e a s o n a b l e minds wou ld have r e a s o n a b l e 
doubt t h a t the d e f e n d a n t committed the c r i m e s t h a t he was charged 
w i t h and found g u i l t y o f . See f S t a t e v . P e t r e e # 659 P.2d 4 4 3 . 
Thi s Court must v i e w the e v i d e n c e in t h e l i g h t m o s t f a v o r a b l e 
t o t h e v e r d i c t , and can o n l y u p s e t t h a t v e r d i c t i f the Court 
i s convinced t h a t r e a s o n a b l e m i n d s , b a s e d upon t h e e v i d e n c e , 
c o u l d n o t f i n d t h e defendant g u i l t y beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t . 
S e e , S t a t e v . G a r c i a , 683 P.2d 60 . The Court f i n d s , based upon 
t h e f o r e g o i n g , t h a t there was s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e for the jury 
to f ind t h e d e f e n d a n t g u i l t y on a l l c o u n t s , and remands t h e 
matter back to the C i r c u i t Court for the i m p o s i t i o n of s e n t e n c e . 
Dated t h i s fIAAQ^y of December, 1 9 8 4 . 
lOtfER F. WILKINSON 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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ADDENDUM C 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S MEMORANDUM 
DECISION IN SUPPORT OF 
THE LOWER COURT 
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He checked the speed on radar, and the unit indicated the pickup 
was traveling 51 mph in a residential area. The Officer turned 
on his overhead lights at approximately 900 West and 10600 South, 
but the vehicle failed to respond. The Officer then turned 
on his spotlight to get the driver's attention, but the vehicle 
did not stop. It finally stopped at 1300 West and 10550 South. 
As the Officer approached the vehicle, a verbal altercation 
occurred, and the Officer asked the driver to produce his license. 
The driver refused, and the Officer informed him that he was 
under arrest, and requested that he step out of the vehicle. 
The driver refused, and sped north in his vehicle. The Officer 
pursued, with his lights and siren activated. The pickup turned 
into a dirt lane at approximately 9450 South 1300 West, and 
drove through an open gate. The young man jumped from the truck, 
closed the gate, and locked it. The Officer entered the property 
with a shotgun, and demanded that the driver exit from the vehicle 
and place his hands on the truck. Officer Smith then asked 
Officer Foster to handcuff the driver. The driver pulled away, 
and indicated that she wasn't man enough to handcuff him. Officer 
Smith then proceeded to handcuff the defendant, and a struggle 
ensued, and Officers Gary Cox and Gene Wallace arrived, and 
assisted in subduing the defendant. They then proceeded to 
transport the defendant to the police vehicle, but a struggle 
ensued at the closed gate, and the defendant and the Officer 
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prosecutor# and they are required to prosecute and conduct on 
behalf of the State of Utah all prosecutions for public offenses 
committed within the County. See, the Utah Constitution, Art. 8, 
Section 10; Utah Code Annotated, Section 17*18-1 (1953 as amended). 
3. The defendant suggests that he could only be arrested 
upon the issuance of an arrest warrant, and therefore the arrest 
by the officers was illegal. The Utah law provides that a peace 
officer may make a warrantless arrest where a public offense 
is committed in his presence, and a public offense is defined 
as including a misdemeanor. See, Utah Code Ann., Section 77-7-2, 
and Oleson v. Pincock, 68 Utah 507, 251 P. 23. An officer is 
not required to inform the defendant, or give him notice of 
intention to cause an arrest, or his authority for the arrest 
when the person being arrested is actively engaged in the commission 
of the offense, or is pursued immediately after the commission 
of such an offense. See, Utah Code Ann., Section 77-7-6 (1953 
as amended. An officer may follow a defendant onto his private 
property and effect the arrest when the offense was committed 
in their presence, and they are in fresh pursuit of the suspect. 
See, Kerr v. California, 374 U.S. 23. There is Ao merit to 
defendants contention that he was held for an unnecessary length 
of time before being taken before a magistrate for arraignment. 
It is not unusual to be arrested on a Saturday, which the defendant 
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ment, but he fails to show how the evidence was insufficient, 
or how he was denied any of his rights, or how he was prejudiced 
by the denial of these rights. When the defendant filed for 
an appeal, he had the burden of showing that the evidence was 
insufficient, and that reasonable minds would have reasonable 
doubt that the defendant committed the crimes that he was charged 
with and found guilty of. See, State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443. 
This Court must view the evidence in the light roost favorable 
to the verdict, and can only upset that verdict if the Court 
is convinced that reasonable minds, based upon the evidence, 
could not find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
See, State v. Garcia, 683 P.2d 60. The Court finds, based upon 
the foregoing, that there was sufficient evidence for the jury 
to find the defendant guilty on all counts, and remands the 
matter back to the Circuit Court for the imposition of sentence. 
Dated this //yu^day of December, 1984. 
iOWER F. WILKINSON 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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